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The Impact of the 
Economic Downturn on 
Local Government in Europe
What Is Happening and What Can Be Done?
Collected texts from the Council of Europe 
with edited commentary by Kenneth Davey
This collection of texts contains updates of the documents presented and/
or adopted at the 16th Session of the Council of Europe Conference of 
Ministers responsible for Local and Regional Government, held in Utrecht, 
16–17 November 2009. It is based on ﬁnal data for 2009 in Council 
of Europe member countries.
The report was prepared in the framework of a joint project of the Council of Europe 
and the Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative of the Open Society 
Foundations. 

1Foreword
This document contains the texts1 on the impact of the economic downturn on local 
government across Europe presented or adopted at the 16th session of the Council of 
Europe Conference of Ministers responsible for Local and Regional Government, held 
in Utrecht (The Netherlands) on 16–17 November 2009, under the general theme 
of “Good local and regional governance in turbulent times: the challenge of change.” 
Ministers agreed that governments must take responsibility to mitigate, counter, 
and overcome the impact of the economic crisis, all the more so because it has poten-
tially wide destructive effects on social cohesion and risks exacerbating societal tensions. 
Any and all action in response to the crisis must remain fully compatible with member 
states’ obligations under the European Charter of Local Self-Government. There is a 
widespread recognition of the need for improvements in governance and in the man-
agement of public expenditure, for increasing efficiency across the whole public sector, 
and for greater collaboration between all stakeholders, central government, and local 
and regional authorities as well as their associations.
The Utrecht Declaration adopted by ministers contains two main parts on this topic, 
reproduced in this collection as I i) and I ii) respectively.
 i) Declaration on the Impact of Financial/Economic Crisis on Local and Regional 
Government
 ii) Guidelines for Policy Responses by Central Government to the Impact of the 
Economic Crisis on Local Government
1 Texts have been updated to reflect the final financial data for 2009.
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This collection further contains the updated report adopted by the European 
Committee on Local and Regional Democracy (CDLR) as the official document for 
the Ministerial Conference on this topic (MCL-16(2009)6a), and the updated report 
presented by the LGI/OSI to the Council of Europe (MCL-16(2009)Inf 1), of which 
the first chapter is the report mentioned above. 
Further to the Utrecht Declaration, work on this topic is continuing as part of 
the Utrecht Agenda. The review conference will take place on 11–12 October 2010 in 
Strasbourg.
Jean-Louis Laurens Rober Ebel
Director General of Democracy LGI Steering Committee Chair
and Political Aﬀairs
September 2010
3Executive Summary
How have local budgets fared in the recession? And, more importantly, how are local 
governments across Europe coping with the prevailing fiscal crisis? What, if anything, 
can be done to minimise harm to the public services they perform?
These questions are addressed in this updated version of a report presented to min-
isters responsible for local and regional government at their 16th Council of Europe 
conference in Utrecht in November 2009. They called for continued monitoring and 
a review during 2010. 
This analysis has been prepared by a team convened by the Local Government 
and Public Service Reform Initiative of the Open Society Foundations (LGI) and the 
Council of Europe’s Committee on Local and Regional Democracy (CDLR), as part of 
their established collaboration.2 It is based on final data for 2009 and a survey of policy 
responses conducted by observers in member countries.
The crisis started in late 2007 with the collapse of overheated housing markets. This 
undermined banks whose failures and government bailouts dominated 2008. By 2009 
these phenomena plunged most European economies into recession. Although 2010 
has brought about a weak recovery, the costs of fiscal stimulus programmes, bailouts, 
and falling revenues have taken a huge toll of national budgets, whose deficits rose from 
2.3% of GDP in 2008 to 6.85% in 2009.
Inevitably this has subjected local governments to a budget squeeze between falling 
revenues, threats to state budget support and the rising costs of debt service and social 
assistance to affected households. 
2 The team was greatly assisted by observers in 32 countries who have supplied data on the financial 
performance of local governments in 2009 and commented on the relevance to their countries of the 
policy options discussed below.
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The severity of the squeeze has varied widely, however. It has depended on several 
variables including:
 • The scale and timing of the national economic downturn.
 • National policy responses; many governments have compensated local gov-
ernments for revenue shortfalls, at least temporarily, to minimise damage to 
employment, construction, and general demand; others have been forced to 
reduce transfers to local government as part of their own austerity packages.
 • The vulnerability of the local revenue base to economic misfortune in the major-
ity of countries surveyed; property taxes have generally proved the most stable, 
while shares of corporate profits or value added taxes have predictably been the 
most volatile. Shares of personal income tax, the most important source for 
local government again in the majority of states, have inevitably reflected cuts 
in jobs, wages, or hours. 
 • Delays in the payment of taxes or in their transfer to local budgets.
 • The degree of responsibility by local budgets for increased social assistance costs.
Allowing for inflation our data on 2009 shows absolute declines in local government 
revenue (compared to 2008) in 16 countries. Elsewhere revenues are simply growing 
far more slowly than before. 
How far this situation will improve and how quickly is far from certain. Threats of 
a double-dip recession are receding and the sovereign debt crisis so far has not spread 
beyond Greece. But experience has shown that the worst impact of previous recessions has 
been felt by local budgets two to three years after general economic recovery as national 
governments try to restore their own fiscal fortunes and cut back on intergovernmental 
transfers. Local government is faced with the possibility of this happening again in 2011 
or 2012. There is also the likelihood of long-term increases in expenditure arising from 
the ageing of European populations and measures to combat climate change.
There have so far been few, if any, major changes in the structure of local revenue 
and expenditure, merely temporary ad hoc adjustments. (An exception is Romania where 
the transfer of competences to local government has been accelerated). For the longer 
term, recent experience must call into question the major reliance of some South Eastern 
European local government systems on shares of a highly volatile tax like VAT. In a few 
cases, national restraint has been imposed on local tax rises, but the general trend has 
been to ease restrictions on local financial autonomy.
More attention has focussed on cutting costs, though in a fairly random and short-
term manner. Pay freezes have been widespread, and even pay cuts. Vacancies have been 
widely frozen, Serbia has mandated staffing cuts, and Hungary has substantially reduced 
the number of elected councillors as terms of office expire. 
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More systematic scrutiny of efficiency has not been widespread, although the Council 
of Europe’s European Label of Governance Excellence aims to promote this. However, 
Internet publication of items of local budget expenditure is spreading in a number of 
countries as an agent of transparency and accountability.
The crisis has added impetus to municipal amalgamations already in progress in five 
countries. More widespread has been enhanced co-operation between local authorities 
in service provision and the sharing of administrative resources and processes. This has 
generally arisen from local initiative.
Cutbacks in services have not been widely reported, but there has been a cull of un-
derutilised institutions, notably small primary schools. In some countries economies have 
been frustrated by unrealistic service standards rigidly enforced by sectoral ministries.
Capital expenditure is normally the first casualty of a fiscal squeeze. This has been 
averted in the new member states of the European Union, since their enhanced entitle-
ment to structural funds has come on stream over the past two years. Local governments 
in the old member states have generally benefited from “fiscal stimulus” programmes, 
funding “shovel ready” projects to sustain employment and the construction industry; 
these are very limited in scope and duration. Governments have widely relaxed restric-
tions on borrowing for both cash flow and investment purposes.
The rising costs of social assistance, arising both from economic distress and demo-
graphic change, call for improved targeting of welfare benefits to the most needy. This 
has been recognised in some cities or states, but not yet widely. It is bound to command 
increasing attention as dependency ratios worsen.
The suddenness and severity of the fiscal crisis has been a shock because it has in-
terrupted a prolonged period of steady growth in local budget resources. It challenges 
previous assumptions about the capacity of the state, both national and local, to deliver 
an indefinite improvement in the scope and standard of public services. To maintain 
the previous momentum will surely demand higher taxation or greater co-operation 
with civil society, particularly in the social sector. 

I. 
Excerpts from the 
Utrecht Declaration 
Adopted by the 
Ministerial Conference

9i) Declaration on the Impact of 
 Financial/Economic Crisis on 
 Local and Regional Government
We, the European Ministers responsible for Local and Regional Government, meeting 
in Utrecht on 16 and 17 November 2009 for the 16th Session of our Conference,
Concerned about the shockwaves the current global economic crisis is sending 
through all our member States affecting them at all levels and in all sectors;
Having examined the impact of the economic crisis on local government in our 
member States on the basis of our individual experiences and the document prepared by 
the European Committee on Local and Regional Democracy in co-operation with the Lo-
cal Government and Public Service Reform Initiative of the Open Society Foundations;
Considering that
 1. the economic crisis is already having a measurable impact on local government 
in our member States, with both a reduction of revenue and an increase of 
expenditure causing a budget squeeze;
 2. so far, the impact differs significantly within and between countries both in 
terms of scale and in terms of timing; 
 3. these differences result from a variety of causes, notably the severity of the down-
turn, the parallel fortunes and responses of national government, the nature of 
the local government revenue and its vulnerability to economic change as well 
as time-lags in taxation systems;
 4. unfortunately and notwithstanding signs of recovery in some sectors, the budget 
squeeze for local government in many cases is likely to get worse before it gets 
better because cushioning effects will wear off and the full extent of the cost 
to communities and people to be borne by local authorities will only become 
apparent in the months and years to come; moreover, the increase in social 
expenditures arising from recession will be exacerbated in the long term by the 
ageing of European populations;
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Agree that
 5. we, the European ministers responsible for local and regional government 
must take responsibility in our areas of competence to mitigate, counter and 
overcome the impact of the economic crisis, and all the more so because it has 
potentially wide destructive effects on social cohesion and risks exacerbating 
societal tensions degenerating into extremism;
Aﬃrm that
 6. the pressure on available resources at all levels further underlines the importance 
of our common objective of delivering good local and regional governance;
 7. to that end local and central government each have their part to play in facing 
up to, sharing the burden of and overcoming the economic crisis;
 8. central governments have a clear responsibility in the resourcing of local au-
thorities, whilst underlining that all levels of government have an obligation to 
maximise efficiency;
 9. because of their knowledge of communities, people and businesses at local and 
regional level, local and regional government can be extremely powerful actors 
in addressing the needs of citizens and facilitating business in overcoming the 
economic crisis; 
 10. whilst the means to be deployed will differ over time and vary from place to 
place, there will be a constant need for efficient and effective collaboration 
between all stakeholders—central government, local and regional authorities 
and their associations—in order to transform the economic crisis from a threat 
into an opportunity for improvement;
 11. exchanging and sharing information and experience at local, regional, national 
and international level, as well as the identification of good practices this enables, 
will be key to achieving success at the earliest possible time;
 12. any and all action must remain fully compatible with the obligations of member 
States under the European Charter of Local Self-Government;
Commit ourselves 
As concerns our respective domestic situations:
 13. to ensure efficient and effective collaboration between all stakeholders—central 
government, local and regional authorities as well as their associations—and; 
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 14. to make use of the guidelines for policy responses to the impact of the economic 
crisis on local government appended to this declaration in order to counter, 
mitigate and overcome the impact of the crisis;
As concerns our co-operation: 
 15. to develop and make the best possible use of our membership of the Council of 
Europe to exchange and share information and experience as well as to identify 
good practices;
 16. to contribute to continued collection of financial and policy data and ensure 
appropriate participation in a review conference to be held in the second half 
of 2010;
 17. to make use of and help develop further the Council of Europe’s capability to 
organise peer reviews, provide legislative and policy assistance as well as capacity 
building programmes;
 18. to work together on the implementation of the Utrecht Agenda as it appears 
below;
 19. to review the overall situation as regards the impact of and responses to the 
economic crisis on local government at our 17th session;
Invite
 20. the Congress and the Parliamentary Assembly to participate in the work to be 
carried out as set out above.
In view of the wide-ranging impact the economic crisis is having on the social and societal 
fabric of our member States and thus on human rights, democracy and the rule of law, 
We further recommend 
 21. to the Council of Europe as a whole and the Committee of Ministers in particular 
to reinforce its focus on the quality of governance (good democratic governance) 
and to establish it as a transversal dimension to guide all intergovernmental 
activities.
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ii) Guidelines for Policy Responses 
 by Central Government to the 
 Impact of the Economic Crisis on 
 Local Government
I. General 
1. Any policy response by central government to the impact of economic downturn on 
local government must be fully compatible with its obligations under the European 
Charter of Local Self-Government (CETS 122), which recognises that questions as 
to the financial resources for local authorities are to be determined within a Party’s 
national economic policy.
2. The two recommendations of the Committee of Ministers in the field of local finance: 
Rec(2004)1 on financial and budgetary management at local and regional levels 
and Rec(2005)1 on the financial resources of local and regional authorities, offer 
a powerful and coherent set of guidelines aimed at ensuring a sound local finance 
system, many of which are ever the more useful in the context of the economic 
downturn. 
3. The economic crisis has generated a widespread recognition of the need for radical 
improvements in governance and in the management of public expenditure. Whilst 
the means to be deployed will differ over time and vary from place to place, there 
will be a constant need for increasing efficiency across the whole of the public sector, 
and hence for greater collaboration between all the stakeholders, central govern-
ment, local and regional authorities as well as their associations. The aim should be 
to remove duplication and to drive down costs arising from a lack of co-ordination, 
integration and of flexibility in the delivery of public services, not only to meet 
the demands of the current fiscal situation, but also to be better placed to address 
longer-term social and economic change.
4. Exchanging and sharing information and experience at local, regional, national and 
international level, as well as the identification of good practices this enables, will 
be key to achieving success at the earliest possible time.
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II. Possible Policy Responses Identiﬁed So Far
The survey of member states carried out in preparation of the 16th Session of the Coun-
cil of Europe Conference of Ministers responsible for local and regional government 
has identified five main possible policy responses, which are reviewed below. It is to be 
stressed that the feasibility and desirability of these options vary from country to country 
and thus are to be seen a range of policy options and not a prescriptive set of measures.
The five main options identified so far are:
 1. Reform of intergovernmental financial relations
 2. Improving accountability and efficiency
 3. Improved targeting of social benefits
 4. Innovative redesign of public services
 5. Enhancing local flexibility and discretion
Reform of Intergovernmental Financial Relations
Major changes in the distribution of responsibilities and resources between levels of 
government are unlikely since in most of the countries surveyed the national budgets 
have suffered more severely than those of local government. Moreover local governments 
need to retain and develop their competences innovatively to respond to economic and 
social challenge.
Local Revenue Bases
Governments and local authority associations might wish to consider changes in those 
local revenue bases which depend substantially on shares of highly volatile taxes such 
as those on corporate profits and value added, since these fit precariously with a high 
percentage of fixed, recurrent commitments like public employee wages and service 
maintenance.
Personal income is the only tax base which is both technically susceptible to varia-
tion by local decision and capable of funding a large proportion of the costs of major 
services, such as education and social and health care. In reforming local revenue bases, 
governments may wish to continue expanding the local sharing or surcharging of personal 
income taxation, a recent trend across Europe. That expansion should continue if major 
progress in fiscal autonomy is to be made, but accompanied by an adequate system of 
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equalising differences in the tax base and avoiding unduly high rates to minimise adverse 
effects on labour market supply in an increasingly globalised world.
Discretion to Set Local Tax Rates and Charges
Whatever the short-term desirability of restraint, the longer-term period of recovery will 
probably demand increases in local taxes and charges and the Charter’s requirement of 
local autonomy in this respect should be respected. Local government discretion to set 
the rates of local taxes and charges should be enhanced in those countries where it is 
still highly restricted. This applies particularly to the taxation of property. Experience 
across Europe has shown that cautious but regular increases in tax rates in line with, 
or just ahead of the general rate of inflation, are a necessary condition for maintaining 
the tax’s significance.
Control over Taxation Pressure
Experience of previous recessions suggests that pressure will mount to increase taxes 
and charges once economic recovery is well in progress. Two considerations, however, 
argue for some restraint. For some kinds of taxation—notably personal income tax 
(PIT) —high tax rates may have long-term effects on labour supply. The second is that 
a number of national laws and policies impose restrictions to ensure that local taxation 
does not discriminate unfairly between domestic and business payers.
Benchmarks to Assess Local Finance Policies
Attention can usefully be given to the set of benchmarks developed by the Council of 
Europe—Centre of Expertise for Local Government Reform—and LGI/OSI to assess 
both the intergovernmental financial relations and the quality of the financial manage-
ment performed by local authorities. Considerable use has been made of the benchmark 
on financial management, and both these benchmarks, along with other benchmarks 
states may develop, could be very useful for governments seeking to understand their 
strengths and weaknesses and aiming at reforming intergovernmental financial relations 
in response to the crisis and beyond.
16
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Improving Accountability and Efﬁciency
Cost Control
Most effort so far this year has gone into cuts in administrative overheads. These may 
well be justified, but this is only one area for achieving efficiency savings. Furthermore, 
some of these tend to be short-term freezes that do not affect long-term efficiency. 
Governments and local authorities should strive for more fundamental examination 
of the practical ways in which services are run, and work to redesign service delivery, 
making use, as appropriate, of both public and private sector partners. This may be 
assisted by several value-for-money and benchmarking techniques that have been devel-
oped in individual countries, and also by the Council of Europe and the Open Society 
Institute. Budgetary information should be readily understandable by the public and 
open to public scrutiny. 
A drive to increase efficiency can be associated with implementation of the Council’s 
current ambitious Strategy for Innovation and Good Governance at the Local Level. 
Municipalities should be encouraged to seek award of its European Label of Governance 
Excellence (ELOGE) for reaching a certain level of quality in their overall governance.3 
Performance Audit
Both national and local governments should endeavour to train and employ sufficient 
personnel to apply performance audit, both externally and internally, to all local au-
thorities and their service institutions, and to stimulate public interest in their findings.
Removing Incentives to Expensive Service Provision
National and local governments should reform those administrative and financial ar-
rangements that encourage services like health and social care to be provided in an 
unnecessarily expensive way. Funding norms, for example, should be based on numbers 
of elderly people, rather than those in residential care.
3 Based in particular on a benchmark/measuring tool specifically tailored to the needs of local authori-
ties, the label will be launched following a road test to start in late 2009. 
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Reviewing Unsustainable Norms
Responsibilities delegated to local governments should not be regulated by national 
governments (and sectoral ministries in particular) in ways that debar local initiatives to 
make services more efficient. Such regulations often apply to the most expensive services 
like education and health care, prescribing types and levels of input rather than outcome. 
Signatories of the European Charter should ensure that national ministries do not micro-
manage services entrusted to local government whether technically delegated or not.
Delegating Institutional Management
Similarly, local governments should so far as possible delegate budgets and their man-
agement to their service institutions, so that their directors are encouraged to maximise 
efficiency in the use of their resources. In doing so, they should take full account of 
exogenous variations in cost such as population density and social background in al-
locating resources between institutions. Audit and other forms of accountability should 
also match degrees of financial delegation. Political steering capacities and political 
accountability of local government bodies should be maintained.
Territorial Reorganisation and Cooperation 
National and local governments could consider territorial reorganisations which can 
reduce expenditure on administrative overheads, increase economies of scale, particularly 
in highly fragmented systems of local government and which may open the way to achiev-
ing a redesign of service delivery, both driving down costs and improving service quality. 
Such reorganisations may well include the types of amalgamation recently undertaken 
in Denmark, Latvia and Turkey and ongoing in Finland, or the kind of reorganisations 
implemented this year in certain areas of the United Kingdom. Savings along with qual-
ity improvements may be achieved, as in the case of Austria, France and Hungary by 
encouraging, including through appropriate incentives, greater co-operation between 
local authorities, both in operating services and undertaking administrative tasks.
Improved Targeting of Social Beneﬁts
Governments could apply means testing to the allocation of social benefits to ensure 
that funds are adequate to increase or sustain assistance to those who are in real poverty. 
Both national and local governments should also review their benefit procedures to 
ensure that the poor are not hindered from access by legal and bureaucratic obstacles.
18
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Innovative Redesign of Public Services 
Given both the immediate effects of the fiscal crisis and the longer-term ageing of 
European populations, governments could consider redesigning local public services 
to increase partnership across the public and private (commercial and not-for-profit) 
sectors, including with nongovernmental organisations and offer more practical support 
to care for the aged and infirm provided by families and neighbours. Such innovative 
redesign might be part of a territorial reorganisation or an intermunicipal co-operation 
programme. 
Enhancing Local Flexibility and Discretion
The downturn has demonstrated the dependence of local fiscal fortunes on differences 
in national policy. But this should not be exacerbated by a deliberate or instinctive re-
centralisation of authority. The kind of efficiency gains and redesign of services outlined 
above are more likely to be achieved through more local flexibility and discretion, not 
less. It will be important for governments to create the circumstances where such flex-
ibility and discretion can flourish, including removing administrative and legal barriers 
and ensuring that the tasks legally required of local authorities remain commensurate 
with the available resources.
II. 
Reports Presented 
on the Impact of 
the Economic Crisis
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i) The Impact of the Economic Crisis 
 on Local Government in Europe: 
 What Policy Responses by 
 Governments4
1. Overview
1.1. Introduction
Amid crashing banks and soaring government debts, local budgets have avoided the 
headlines. But how have they fared in the recession? And, more importantly, how are 
local governments across Europe coping with the prevailing fiscal crisis? What, if any-
thing, can be done to minimise harm to the public services they perform?
These questions were posed by ministers responsible for local and regional govern-
ment at their 16th Council of Europe conference in Utrecht in November 2009. They 
were debating an earlier version of this analysis prepared by a team convened by the 
Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative of the Open Society Founda-
tions (LGI) and the Council of Europe’s Committee on Local and Regional Democracy 
(CDLR), as part of their established collaboration.5 
The Utrecht Declaration named the impact of the financial crisis as their first priority 
for the Council of Europe’s attention. It called for continued monitoring, and in answer 
to a subsequent questionnaire CDLR members put particular emphasis on comparing 
the practical responses of individual states and local authorities. 
4 Chapter II.i. “overview” was adopted by the European Committee on Local and Regional Democracy 
(CDLR) for presentation at the Council of Europe Conference of Ministers Responsible for Local and 
Regional Government. It was reproduced in full as a first chapter in document MCL16(2009)Inf 1. 
Subsequent chapters of MCL16(2009)Inf 1 appear at p.39. The entire report was updated in August 
2010 with figures and new analysis for the situation up to the end of 2009.
5 The team was greatly assisted by observers in 32 countries who supplied data on the financial perfor-
mance of local governments in 2009 and commented on the relevance to their countries of the policy 
options discussed below.
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This analysis has been prepared by the LGI/CDLR team on the basis of final data 
for 2009 and a survey of policy responses conducted by observers in member countries.
1.2. Impacts
1.2.1. The Crisis
OECD reports that GDP in the Eurozone fell by 4.1% in 2009 and unemployment 
reached 10%. 
It all started with the collapse of overheated housing markets, initially in the United 
States late in 2007, but repeated in the United Kingdom and other EU member states. 
This undermined banks which had provided mortgages too generously, again initially in 
the United States but soon infecting European banks that had also bought into the sub-
prime mortgage market. Bank failures and bailouts by national governments dominated 
2008. Those banks that did not fail were imbued with a new and heightened caution 
which led them to scale back or deny previous support to business through working 
capital, letters of credit, and investment loans. 
The banking crisis affected local governments directly:
 • Loss of dividends from banks partly owned by local governments such as Dexia 
and the Austrian Kommunalkredit. (€52.7 million in the case of Flemish com-
munes).
 • Loss of reserves and devaluation of pension funds (14 Dutch municipalities lost 
€85 million and British local authorities over €1 billion in failing Icelandic 
banks).
 • Difficulty in obtaining or rolling over credit for investment (particularly from 
previously active foreign lenders such as the Scandinavian banks in the Baltic 
states or Austrian banks in Central and Eastern Europe).
 • Increased cost of servicing debt denominated in euros with depreciating national 
currency.
The collapse of housing markets devastated construction industries across Europe 
(and the employment of much migrant labour sending remittances home). The con-
traction of bank commercial credit has widened the impact to business activity overall 
leading to the following: 
 • Rising unemployment (20% in Latvia at the beginning of 2010, 19% in Spain);
 • Declines in industrial production (down 19.4% in the European Union in the 
year to April 2009; Slovak car production fell by 50% in the same period);
23
I I .  R E P O R T S  P R E S E N T E D  O N  T H E  I M PA C T  O F  T H E  E C O N O M I C  C R I S I S
 • Falls in external trade (Bosnian exports fell by 19% in the year to March 2009, 
imports by 25%);
 • Dramatic falls in remittance income to the labour exporting states which is 
estimated to provide 30% of GDP in Moldova, 15 in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Having devoured housing markets and banks, the crisis has now moved on to its 
latest victim, government budgets. Deficits of EU member governments rose from 
2.3% of GDP in 2008 to 6.85% in 2009, due to losses of tax revenue, expenditure on 
“fiscal stimulus” programmes, and bank bailouts. Deficits exceeded 10% of GDP in 
four countries, Ireland, Greece, the UK, and Spain. Ironically the same rating agen-
cies that had been discredited by their failures to identify the weakness of banks have 
threatened the ability of governments to refinance sovereign debt; starting with Greece 
this has precipitated governments in 2010 to fiscal austerity policies, which Keynesians 
regard as premature. 
Inevitably this has subjected local governments to a budget squeeze between falling 
revenues, threats to state budget support and the rising costs of debt service and social 
assistance to affected households. The timing and magnitude of that impact, however, 
depends on tax bases, tax procedures, and national policies. These forces will be discussed 
in the following paragraphs.
1.2.2. Current Revenues: Taxation and Fees
The impact of the crisis on local government current revenues has varied widely depend-
ing on several conditions: 
 • The severity of the downturn.
 • The parallel fortunes and responses of national government.
 • The nature of the local revenue base and its vulnerability to economic change.
 • Time-lags due to the taxation system. In Hungary, for example, receipts of 
shares in personal income tax (PIT) in 2010 are based on collections in 2008 
(a similar delay occurring in Belgium) while business tax payments are assessed 
on turnover in 2009, leading to a one-year delay, at least in the downturn being 
fully experienced by local budgets. In Denmark and Sweden PIT is collected by 
the centre which forwards to the local authorities the amounts they have voted 
in their budgets, reconciling these with actual collections two years later.
OECD analysis of its member states finds that previous economic downturns 
have had the least adverse effect on revenue from property taxes, moderate impacts on 
personal income taxes, and the most severe effects on the taxation of business turnover 
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and corporate profits. These statistics confirm common sense expectations and are borne 
out so far by the experience of the current recession.
The dramatic fall in housing values might have been expected to affect revenues from 
local taxes on property, the most common local tax source in Europe. Radical declines 
have occurred in those American cities (20% in Washington, D.C.) where assessments 
are automatically indexed to changes in market values. This is not the case, however, in 
most European countries since property taxation is generally based on formula valua-
tions which are updated very infrequently, if ever. This robs the tax of buoyancy when 
times are good, but provides welcome stability during an economic downturn.
In the United Kingdom, revenue from the residential property Council Tax has 
continued to rise by £1 billion in each of the last four years. Most countries report a 
rise in property and land tax yields, some sharp (e.g., 25% in Ukraine in 2009, 28% in 
Russia, 23% in Czech Republic). It is likely that local authorities faced with a decline 
in revenue from more lucrative taxes or from transfers have simply put more effort into 
improving the assessment and collection of property tax. Sofia, for example, obtained 
court orders freezing the bank accounts of defaulters; it collected arrears worth €20 
million in 2009.
Property tax receipts are, however, vulnerable in times of recession to growing default 
and to pressure, particularly from business owners, for exemptions and reductions. In 
France, the Taxe Professionelle, which was assessed on the rental value of business as-
sets, has been replaced in response to business pressure. Default reduced Greek yields 
by 19.5% in 2009. Rural municipalities in Poland granted 32% more individual rate 
concessions in 2009. In both France and United Kingdom, incapacity to pay the tax is 
effectively compensated by government, a hidden but rising subsidy in times or places 
of economic distress.
By contrast, local taxes on property sales have fallen instantly and dramatically. 
Previously worth over €8 billion annually in France, their decline has been a particular 
blow to French departements (which are also faced with the major costs of social assis-
tance). In Bulgaria, revenue from this source fell by over 30% in 2009. In Spain 2008 
receipts were 40% lower than in 2007. 
Access by local government to personal income taxation varies across Europe, as 
does its method—whether by sharing with national government or local surcharge, 
whether assigned by origin (place of residence or employment) or by formula. But regard-
less of method, where such access exists the revenue is highly significant to local budgets 
(70% of total local revenue in Ukraine, 50% in Estonia) and buoyant (growing by 47% 
in Slovakia over the four years preceding the crisis). PIT is also a major resource for 
large local governments throughout Nordic countries, Central Europe, and Switzerland.
Rising unemployment obviously hits PIT revenues, and those still with a job may 
earn less through cuts in hours, bonuses, or even wage rates (15% for public employees 
in Latvia, excluding teachers and the lowest earners). Some countries have also reduced 
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income tax rates in attempts to boost consumption; maximum rates in Poland had 
already fallen from 40% to 32%, and taxable income thresholds have been raised in 
Hungary. Most dramatically in Ukraine, where PIT accrues entirely to oblast, city, and 
rayon budgets, revenues have fallen over the last year by over 20% in real terms largely 
due to wage arrears.
Local taxes on business proﬁts or turnover are isolated and idiosyncratic, often 
victims to accusations of distorting competition in a global marketplace. They are also 
highly vulnerable to economic recession. German local governments are reporting major 
declines in the gewerbesteuer (a local tax based on company profits), losses reflected in 
major increases in municipal overdrafts with local savings banks. Similarly the Hungar-
ian Business Tax, levied retrospectively on turnover, will show the effects of downturn 
mainly in 2010. But Czech municipalities have experienced a 27% fall in corporate 
profits tax shares in 2009, and Finnish municipalities expect revenues from their 22.3% 
share of this tax to have been 24% lower in 2009. Polish regions received 14.3% less 
from their share in 2009. Portugal reports reduction in Municipal Contributions (a 
surcharge on corporate profits tax). Russian regions suffered the biggest drop in CPT 
revenues in 2009, amounting to 70%.
Value added taxation is widely shared with local governments in South Eastern 
Europe, as compensation for the abolition of the local sales taxes, prevalent in the former 
Yugoslavia. Its yields are directly related to volumes and values of production and com-
merce and therefore highly vulnerable to their decline. These shares represent half the 
municipal revenue in Bosnia and yields declined by 17.5% in 2009 in Republica Srpska. 
Impacts on revenue from fees and charges are less clear since they are divided between 
the budgets of local authorities and their utility companies. Reductions of income from 
building permits and other development charges have been widely reported, particularly 
in the United Kingdom. Falls in water supply, sewerage, heating, and refuse collection 
charges have been reported in Latvia, while in Ukraine only 60% of households are 
actually meeting utility charges.
1.2.3. Revenues: Intergovernmental Transfers
OECD analysis of previous recessions indicates that intergovernmental transfers are 
historically the most volatile source of local budget revenue. This experience is being 
repeated.
National government responses to falling municipal revenues have varied radically. 
In 2009, Albanian, British, Danish, Finnish, Norwegian, Polish, Slovak, and Swedish 
governments all compensated local governments for falling revenues and rising expendi-
tures, partly through deliberate countercyclical policy and partly as an automatic result 
of equalisation formulae. Danish fiscal rules require general grants to be countercyclical. 
Norwegian grants rose by 1.2 billion krone. The Ukrainian government has added 10% 
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of corporate profits taxation to the equalisation pool. The Russian Federal Budget for 
2009 included a 36% increase in transfers to regional governments.
In contrast, Bulgaria reduced its grant for mandatory services (education, social 
welfare, health service, etc.) by 10% in 2009. Also in 2009, Serbia reduced grants by 
15bn dinars (equal to 8.5% of total revenue), Estonia cut its Equalisation Fund by 20% 
while grants for preschool education and road maintenance were eliminated in Latvia. 
The Irish government cut its general purpose grants by 9.6%. Despite increases in 
federal funding, a number of Russian regions have reduced equalisation grants to their 
municipalities because of falls in their own CPT revenues. In a number of cases such as 
Serbia, these cuts have been mandated by standby agreements with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). 
1.2.4. Current Expenditure
Mention has already been made of the increasing cost of servicing debt, due partly to 
banking failures, partly to rises in bank lending rates and partly to the devaluation of 
national currency against the euro in which many municipal loans have been denomi-
nated. The cost of municipal debt service in Serbia, for example, rose by 26% in 2009. 
The burden is particularly severe for those local governments that were already heavily 
indebted before the crisis.
The impact of increased social expenditures on municipal budgets varies greatly, 
partly because of differences between countries and regions in the severity of the crisis, 
but also because of great variations in the extent of municipal responsibility for social 
assistance. A further variable is the duration of unemployment insurance benefits after 
dismissal, delaying eligibility for social assistance.
Responsibility for basic entitlements like unemployment benefits, old-age pensions, 
and incapacity allowances normally lies with national government or its insurance agen-
cies. Depending on country systems, however, local government may bear some of the 
extra costs of the following:
 • Housing and utility allowances (because of falling household incomes or slower 
reimbursement by central government).
 • Safety net payments to the long-term unemployed and others eligible for mini-
mum income guarantees.
 • Emergency aid to families in advance of awards of state benefits.
Local governments may also administer state benefits, subject to reimbursement.
Costs to Danish municipalities of social assistance and employment initiatives have 
risen by 8%. Croatia and Russia also report rising social assistance costs, while both 
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British and Italian local governments are coping with higher demand for housing allow-
ances and homelessness. Since there is generally a time-lag between recession and the 
growth of unemployment (and between economic recovery and recovering employment), 
this burden may be expected to grow in 2010; Hungarian municipalities are experiencing 
a 22% rise in social assistance expenditure so far in 2010, on top of a 14% rise in 2009. 
The full impact is also delayed by the short-term coverage of unemployment insurance.
1.2.5. Capital Budgets
Local government capital expenditure has generally ranked high as a proportion of 
general public investment, 55.6% in the EU in 2008. Its regular funding sources have, 
however, been badly depleted by the crisis:
 • The current budget squeeze has reduced or eliminated operating surplus.
 • The ability or willingness of banks to supply credit or buy bonds has been se-
verely reduced (although Central European banks are proving able to provide 
short-term pre-financing of EU structural funding).
 • Shortage of credit has also reduced the appetite of private enterprise for public-
private partnerships (these petered out in Slovakia in 2008; there have been no 
projects in Poland although the legal framework was enacted in 2005).
 • The potential value of, and market for, asset sales have also shrunk.
Nevertheless there has been a vigorous and widespread governmental response to 
this aspect of the downturn. Accelerated capital investment features prominently in 
countercyclical policy, protecting employment particularly in the damaged construction 
industry and stimulating consumption generally. 
As a result governments have made additional funds widely available to local gov-
ernments for capital projects: 
 • Austria has a €3 billion Municipal Infrastructure Package financed by loans but 
with federal and state governments meeting 75% of debt service costs.
 • France is advancing the reimbursements of VAT on local government 
construction.
 • The German federal budget has allocated €10 billion for state and municipal 
investments (25% cofunded by recipients).
 • Greece has established a €2.3 billion local investment fund jointly funded by 
government, the European Union, and local authorities.
 • Norway spent 4 billion krone on small local investments in 2009.
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Similar funds have been established in Portugal, Spain (€8 billion), Sweden, and 
Ukraine (371 projects repairing schools, hospitals, sports stadia, etc., at a cost of UAH 
20 billion).
These funds have two frequent features. They are expected to finance projects that 
are “shovel ready,” i.e., capable of immediate execution. Second, they often have a strong 
environmental bias, e.g., energy saving modification of public buildings (and occasionally 
social housing), replacement of street lighting bulbs (Netherlands), or home insulation 
(UK). In Spain, the condition to access the 2010 State Fund for Local Investment is 
that projects have a research, development, and innovation content related to sustain-
able development.
Coupled with this effort by national governments is an acceleration in the disburse-
ment of European Union structural funds in new member states. Fortunately, the major 
increase in allocations to them under the 2007–13 budget, came on stream as the crisis 
developed. This has also involved some relaxation of the EU’s own accounting and 
procurement rules. It has also been facilitated by national efforts in countries such as 
Bulgaria, Estonia, and Hungary to provide bridging finance for municipalities faced 
with heavy costs of prefinancing and noneligible expenditure. In Hungary over 80% 
of structural fund allocations available under the 2007 to 2013 EU budget are already 
covered by construction contracts.
In some respects the abrupt decline of supply-led pressure by banks to lend is a 
benefit. The flow of bank credit to local governments is in most countries now well 
regulated by appropriate debt or debt service ratios and legal procedures governing 
municipal default. Much of the accelerated flow of EU investment funding is now 
supported by short-term bank funding of matching contributions, prefinancing, and 
nonreimbursable costs. 
1.2.6. The Overall Impact
The impacts of the crisis on local budgets have been very specific to individual countries 
and authorities within countries. Falling revenues and rules prescribing balanced budgets 
make contraction almost universal, but its scale and timing are not. 
Allowing for inflation our data on 2009 shows absolute declines in local government 
revenue (compared to 2008) in 16 countries. These falls were sharpest (over 10% in real 
terms) in Republika Srpska, Latvia, Serbia, Russia, Ukraine, and Iceland. Lesser falls, 
again in real terms, were experienced in Armenia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Lithuania, Portugal, and Romania. Elsewhere revenues 
are simply growing far more slowly than before. 
This may seem less catastrophic than might have been supposed, and in all except 
three countries, less severe than the plight of national budgets. But in several countries 
such as Hungary the impact has been delayed until 2010 by tax time-lags. It has also 
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been cushioned where own revenues have fallen sharply but national government has 
been both anxious and able to sustain levels of local expenditure through grants or to 
facilitate increased borrowing as part of a countercyclical policy, a typical situation in 
Western Europe. 
In the Baltic states, the recession grew rapidly from early 2008 and the impact on 
local budgets was already severe. Elsewhere the crisis has been equally sudden but more 
recent, with several countries recording declining revenues in the first quarter or half 
of 2009, despite growth through 2008. 
1.3. Responses
1.3.1. The Need for Policy Responses
Every local government system in Europe has experienced some financial downturn, in 
some cases merely a slowdown in growth rates, but in others a real contraction. It has 
come as a shock, following a period of sustained growth.
The downturn’s severity varies greatly and its duration is unknown. First half data 
for 2010 suggests a slow recovery of GDP; OECD predicts 1.2% growth this year in 
the Eurozone (contrasting with a more robust 4.6% worldwide) with unemployment 
at 8.5%. The EU/IMF bailout of Greek government debt and widespread adoption of 
fiscal austerity measures have so far stemmed the collapse of bond markets for Italian, 
Portuguese, and Spanish sovereign debt predicted during the Greek debt crisis. The 
European economic situation is better than seemed likely at the end of 2009, but still 
sufficiently volatile that chances of a double-dip recession, aggravated by government 
belt-tightening cannot be dismissed.
As we have seen, some local revenues will only feel the impact of current circum-
stances in one or two years’ time. Inflation fell to zero in May 2009 and construction 
costs have generally fallen, but inflation is currently back to 1.5% and the recent volatility 
of oil prices underlines the risk of resumption along with its effect on local expenditure. 
How soon local governments’ fiscal fortunes will benefit from recovery and how far 
remain very open questions.
Moreover, the OECD’s memory of a squeeze on local government following, 
rather than during, previous recessions is sobering. It is when economic recovery is in 
progress that governments seek to reduce their newly inflated debt, cutting transfers 
and encouraging tax increases in the process. The 2010 G20 summit failed to agree, 
despite the urging of the United States, to sustain fiscal stimulus policies, but how long 
markets will allow governments to run spending deficits that grew in the G20 states 
from 1.1% of GDP in 2007 to 8.1% in 2009, remains to be seen. The IMF reckons 
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that all European governments except Norway will eventually have to tighten budgets 
in order to pay interest on accumulated debt. Local governments cannot expect to 
escape the consequences.
To add to this pressure on local budgets, most European countries face the long-
term consequences of demographic change involving local government in the care 
of an increasingly elderly (though not necessarily infirm) population. The developed 
world’s population over 60 is set to increase from 22.5% now to 35% by 2050. The 
IMF reckons that the effect of increased pension, health, and social care costs on public 
budgets will be about nine times the cost of servicing the extra debt incurred during 
the current fiscal crisis. Serious measures to slow down the rate of global warming are 
likely to add to the strain.
Economic and social distress may also lead to wider threats to public order with their 
own consequences for public budgets at all levels of government. Conversely, recovery 
will demand local investment in the infrastructure, skills, and environmental improve-
ment critical to the revival of local employment and economic activity.
Governments, national and local, should not therefore treat the current strain on 
local government as a purely temporary blip, with a return to previous growth just round 
the corner. Longer-term measures to cope with fiscal pressure and make the most of 
lower resources have to be considered. This section outlines some of the options. Their 
feasibility and desirability vary from country to country, an a la carte menu, not table 
d’hôte.
1.3.2. Reforms of Intergovernmental Financial Relations
Conceptually, one way to relieve pressure on local budgets is to change the framework 
of intergovernmental finance to: 
 • reduce local government responsibilities, or
 • increase its revenues.
Is such reform feasible or desirable?
As mentioned already, some European governments have compensated local 
governments for falls in revenue and/or increased costs, but this has not involved any 
fundamental reform, just the application of existing equalisation systems. The only 
substantive reform has been in Ukraine where 10% of corporate profits tax (not a pot 
of gold in current circumstances) has been added to the equalisation pool and its scope 
extended to the lowest tier of local government and the cost of housing and communal 
services; this is likely to represent more a redistribution of local budget resources than 
an increase. Minor adjustments to the assignment of PIT shares have been made in 
Croatia along with a proclaimed intention to increase property tax rates.
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However bad the impact of the downturn on local budgets, the impact on national 
finances is generally worse. Country reports show national budgets contracting to a 
greater degree than local budgets in all except three countries (Germany, Hungary, and 
Estonia, where only a doubling of EU funding and property sales have partly compen-
sated for the fall in national taxes). National governments are more dependent on the 
more vulnerable revenues from corporate profits, customs duties, VAT, etc., and have 
to pay unemployment benefits and fund fiscal stimulus packages. They are generally 
ill-placed to relieve local governments of cost burdens or transfer revenues to them. 
Most are struggling to raise debt finance and will be struggling to repay it.
Only one reduction in responsibilities has been reported by observers; the Roma-
nian government has assumed the full cost of minimum income guarantees (previously 
cofunded by municipalities). This is rational since gross disparities in local revenue 
bases were spilling over into basic social provision, a clearly undesirable result. In any 
case, it has been offset by the transfer of hospitals and public transport systems to local 
government. Generally, however, a diminution in local government responsibilities is 
not an answer to the fiscal crisis, which gives added importance to the potential virtues 
of local initiative and responsiveness.
Major changes in intergovernmental finance are, therefore, unlikely. But two is-
sues remain. The first concerns the assignment of shares in volatile taxes like VAT and 
corporate profits taxation to local government in the relatively few countries where this 
is practised. It seems logical that levels of government with a high percentage of fixed, 
recurrent commitments like public employee wages and service maintenance should 
not depend significantly on volatile revenues. One can argue, au contraire, that local 
public services should enjoy their fair share of rising public revenues and equally share 
the consequences of their decline. The question is open, the answer depending both 
on the severity of the crisis and on which services are performed by local government; 
more political priority usually attaches to the protection of education and health care 
than to the maintenance of physical infrastructure.
The most lucrative local tax source across Europe is sharing or surcharging of personal 
income tax. It is the only tax base that is both technically susceptible to variation by 
local decision and capable of funding a large proportion of the costs of the major edu-
cational and social care services. Local freedom to determine its incidence has expanded 
in recent years from its Scandinavian and Swiss heartlands to Spanish regions, Italian 
regions and municipalities, and Croatian counties and municipalities. That expansion 
should continue if major progress in fiscal autonomy is to be made, but accompanied 
by an adequate system of equalising differences in the tax base and some limits on rates 
to avoid adverse effects on labour market supply in an increasingly globalised world.
Property is the most common base of autonomous local taxation, (i.e., subject to 
local rate setting), but a relatively low percentage of local revenue overall. It is unlikely 
that radical changes in valuation methods will be undertaken, but the political resistance 
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to increased incidence could be countered by greater attention to the link between 
tax bills and household income. In Eastern Europe, experience has shown that 
municipal freedom to apply cautious but regular increases in tax rates in line with, or 
just ahead of the general rate of inflation, is a necessary condition for maintaining the 
tax’s significance.
One interesting conclusion of our data analysis is that the most vulnerable revenue 
bases have been those relying heavily on a single source, whether own revenue or inter-
governmental transfer. The most resilient bases have been those like the Polish combining 
a mix of revenue sources with rational distributive formulae.
The second question relates to the freedom to set the rates of local taxes and charges, 
enjoined by the European Charter of Local Self-Government but still very restricted in 
several Eastern and South Eastern European countries. 
Increasing taxes and charges may ease budget strain and improve the efficiency of 
utility services, but (as opposed to countercyclical grants) it may restrain consumption 
and exacerbate recession. This is a dilemma, with which local authorities are already 
grappling. Different Polish municipalities are taking contrary approaches, variously 
increasing or reducing rates of property tax. Danish municipalities wishing to increase 
PIT surcharges are in conflict with national government. The Irish government has per-
suaded local authorities to restrict annual property tax rate increases to 1.15% overall. 
The incoming British government has frozen Council Tax rates for two years. On the 
other hand French departements and communes increased taxes in 2009 by an average 
5–6% without national restraint.
Whatever the short-term desirability of restraint, the longer-term period of recovery 
will probably demand increases in local taxes and charges and the Charter’s requirement 
of local autonomy in this respect should be respected universally. Two considerations, 
however, argue for some restraint. For some kinds of taxation—notably PIT—high 
tax rates may have long-term effects on labour supply. The second is that a number of 
national laws and policies impose restrictions to ensure that local taxation does not dis-
criminate unfairly between domestic and business payers. These are justifiable, not only 
because commercial recovery should not be impaired, but also because the underlying 
reason for fiscal autonomy is to encourage accountability to electors, and households 
should therefore share the consequences of local fiscal policy. Increases in utility charges 
also need to be accompanied by an adequate system of housing subsidies for the lowest 
income households.
Based on the Council of Europe acquis, the Centre of Expertise of the Council of 
Europe and the Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative of the Open 
Society Foundations developed a set of benchmarks to assess both the intergovernmen-
tal financial relations and the quality of the financial management performed by local 
authorities. While the benchmarks concerning local financial management proper met 
with demand and have already been successfully implemented, the ones aimed at help-
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ing central governments to assess their policies concerning local finance are yet to raise 
interest among central governments. These benchmarks could, however, be very useful 
for governments seeking to understand their strengths and weaknesses and aiming at 
reforming intergovernmental financial relations in response to the crisis and beyond. 
1.3.3. Improving Accountability and Eﬃciency
Making the most of more limited resources is likely to be an ongoing challenge. Im-
proving the efficiency and effectiveness of local government expenditure has many 
manifestations, discussed more fully in Chapter III. They aim chiefly to make both 
elected and appointed officials more accountable for the use of public funds.
Cost Control
Country observers’ reports detail many efforts by individual local governments to 
reduce costs. These mainly apply to administrative overheads and include cuts in over-
time, bonuses, official entertainment, and telephone usage, while purchases of vehicles 
and furniture and filling vacancies have been frozen. In the case of Romania, some of 
these have been mandated by efficiency measures agreed with the European Union as 
conditions for national budget support. In Latvia, municipal employees have shared a 
national 15% cut in public service pay while Hungarian municipal staff have lost their 
13th month bonus; public service pay will be frozen for two years in the UK. In Serbia, 
GPS systems have been fitted in municipal vehicles so that both drivers and town halls 
know where they are.
Justified as they may be, these are temporary or one-off savings that do not greatly affect 
longer-term efficiency. This requires more fundamental examination of the practical ways 
in which services are run, the subject of “value for money” approaches and performance 
audit systems developed over the last three decades under the umbrella of New Public 
Management. Chapter III outlines three such efforts that deserve wider application:
 • “Value for money” assessments of individual authorities and services are under-
taken on a voluntary basis by the Danish Local Government Association, based 
like their British equivalents on disseminating the practice of those municipalities 
that perform well in a comparison of unit costs.
 • Benchmarking individual service and administrative service costs carried out in 
Bulgaria by the Open Society Foundations in collaboration with the Resource 
Centre for Decentralization and Municipal Development and Club Economika 
2000.
 • Performance standards measured by the Benchmarking Club of Hungarian 
water company managers, with the consultant help of the Regional Centre for 
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Energy Policy Research at the Corvinus University of Budapest and based on 
comparing a range of technical and management issues.
Benchmarking is one of the tools designed to help the public scrutinise the care 
with which its money is being used. Another is the Citizens Charter, usually a promise 
to citizens to deliver services at certain standards and a set of procedures by which they 
can check its fulfilment.
The Council of Europe has been helping to develop performance management 
capacity in a number of countries such as Bulgaria, Russia, and Serbia. It also supports 
French efforts in this field. The financial downturn emphasises the need.
A less formal approach to curbing excessive costs has been adopted by a variety of local 
governments from Greece to the UK who publish details of all items of expenditure over 
a fixed limit (Windsor’s €600 is typical) on the Internet for scrutiny by zealous media.
Performance Audit
In 2006, the Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative surveyed the audit 
of local governments in 12 Eastern and South Eastern European states. It found that 
most states had an adequate legislative framework, much of it newly enacted with EU 
assistance, but so far implementation has been weak:
 • Qualified auditors were in short supply in the public sector and as a result ac-
tual external audits infrequent. Inevitably the situation was worse in countries 
with large numbers of small authorities. (Only 84 out of 7,455 Romanian local 
government final accounts had been audited.)
 • Audit was still largely concerned with legality and conformity with required 
procedure; performance and efficiency, though within its terms of reference, 
were rarely examined. Audit training in these aspects was often inadequate.
 • Public interest in audit findings was generally low, not aided by the customary 
opacity and circumspection of published reports.
The Council of Europe has been helping to develop performance audit capacity 
in a number of countries such as Bulgaria, Russia, and Serbia. The financial downturn 
reinforces the need.
The current ambitious Strategy for Innovation and Good Governance at Local Level, 
launched by the Council of Europe, includes among its implementation measures the 
development of a European Label of Governance Excellence (ELOGE) that would be 
attributed in a decentralised manner to municipalities reaching a certain level of quality 
in their overall governance. Based in particular on a benchmark/measuring tool specifi-
cally tailored to the needs of local authorities, the label, if successful (it is currently being 
road tested), could be very effective in supporting the improvement of local governance. 
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Removing Incentives to Expensive Service Provision
The crisis has encouraged a cull of underutilised service institutions. Bulgaria, Hungary, 
Moldova, Romania, and the UK all report such measures, with small rural schools the 
most common target. But local government is often encouraged by administrative and 
financial arrangements to provide services in an unnecessarily expensive way.
For example, in a number of countries such as Hungary and Ukraine, responsibili-
ties for residential care for the elderly and infirm and hospital care lie with the upper 
tiers of local government, while the municipalities provide domiciliary and primary 
health care. Funding of the upper tier service may well be based on formulas involv-
ing numbers housed or treated. These arrangements may provide strong incentives to 
place social service clients in residential homes or patients in hospitals when it may be 
neither the most appropriate nor sympathetic response to their need. In most cases it 
is the more expensive solution.
Medical care costs can also be inflated by a system of paying providers per admission 
or individual treatment. These perverse incentives are widely recognised and systems like 
DRG (diagnosis-related group) funding have been designed to reduce them. But such 
reforms have not been universal and the crisis underlines their importance. The recent 
introduction in Hungary of a small charge for seeing general practitioners was also effective 
in reducing unnecessary demands on their time, until countermanded by a referendum.
Other examples of excessive social sector costs abound. Schools with declining pupil 
populations, for example, frequently retain previous numbers of teaching staff while 
mandated contact hours with pupils are generously low.
Reviewing Unsustainable Norms
Local governments that would like to cut costs are frequently debarred by national regu-
lation. This applies particularly in countries that distinguish between the “autonomous” 
and “delegated” tasks of local government and place the more expensive services like 
education, social service, and health care in the latter category.
Delegated services are often regulated by detailed standards of provision, and local 
government management is subject to close supervision by sectoral ministries. These 
norms typically govern inputs, rather than outcomes. Ukrainian local governments 
cannot close grossly underutilised schools or social and cultural institutions without the 
permission of national ministries, frequently withheld. Such institutions may well have 
lost their custom through changes in population or public preference.
The problem is typically exacerbated by the fact that the sectoral ministries con-
cerned are not faced with the consequences of running uneconomic services, since the 
financing of delegated services is usually governed solely by the Ministry of Finance. 
Several national rapporteurs comment that failure to meet unsustainable service stan-
dards is widespread but tolerated. Others identify national insistence on observing the 
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norms as a serious problem. Signatories of the European Charter should be ensuring 
that national ministries do not micromanage services entrusted to local government 
whether technically delegated or not.
Delegating Institutional Management
The same principle applies to the relations between local governments and their own 
subsidiary agencies and institutions.
When budgets have to be cut, it is usually their managers who know best where 
waste is occurring. It is only the school head who will bother that lights are switched 
off at the end of the day and only then if the school budget keeps the savings.
Delegating budgets and their managements to service institutions is another aspect 
of New Public Management that is now widespread; per-pupil funding of schools is 
now widely adopted, for example.
These solutions, though timely in a period of recession, need careful introduction, 
however. Budget allocations need to take full account of exogenous variations in cost. 
Population density and social background have major impacts on school expenditure, 
for example. Audit and other forms of accountability must match degrees of financial 
delegation.
Territorial Reorganisation
The average size of local governments varies enormously between countries; average 
municipal populations range from 1,640 in the Czech Republic and 1,720 in France 
to 56,570 in Lithuania and 139,480 in the United Kingdom. Amalgamation, widely 
practised in the 1960s and 1970s, but also widely reversed in former socialist countries 
after 1989, is back on national agendas.
Denmark has merged 271 municipalities into 98. Georgia replaced 985 munici-
palities, mostly villages, with 64 large district authorities based on the former rayons, 
a policy already adopted in Lithuania. The number of Finnish municipalities has 
been reduced from 447 to 348, and new rules are imposing the minimum population 
required for the provision and administration of services such as health care and voca-
tional education. Greece, Iceland, and Latvia have also greatly reduced the number of 
municipal authorities.
Larger municipalities should spend a smaller proportion of their resources on ad-
ministrative overheads and achieve greater economies of scale. But, while amalgamation 
may enable local authorities to provide a larger range or quality of services, there is no 
evidence that it saves money overall. Quite apart from the one-off costs of reorganisa-
tion, there is a tendency for merged authorities to adopt the most expensive habits 
of their individual forerunners. The failure of empirical studies to show savings from 
amalgamations may be explained by the fact that the more obvious economies of scale 
had already been realised by intermunicipal co-operation.
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It may be easier to achieve economy by increasing co-operation between munici-
palities. In Hungary, the number of municipal landfills has shrunk by 90% through 
the formation of joint utility companies able to maximise the use of modern technol-
ogy and EU structural funding, while subregional associations share the professional 
resources and equipment needed for administrative operations like tax collection and 
development control. In France, both legal and financial incentives have led to a large 
increase in the number of communautés urbaines providing integrated planning and 
service delivery within conurbations.
Even in the UK where local authorities have on average exceptionally large 
populations, the crisis has promoted much joint management of services. The city of 
Westminster has joined its neighbouring borough, Kensington and Chelsea, in run-
ning a single education service. Northern Irish authorities have formed “coalitions” to 
manage procurement, IT, and development control.
Improved Targeting of Social Beneﬁts
Social benefits are frequently distributed without regard to financial circumstances. All 
British pensioners (including the writer) automatically receive a winter fuel allowance 
of £200, without application. In Lithuania, 64% of social assistance costs are on uni-
versal benefits, notably child allowances. In the countries of the former Soviet Union, 
numerous allowances or free services are provided to various categories of “veteran” (of 
war, labour, natural catastrophe, etc.). 
Mothers of young children and pensioners tend to be the main beneficiaries. What 
probably unites pensioners is not poverty (those with inflation-proof pensions, discharged 
mortgages, and grown-up children may well have ample disposable income), but the 
time to vote and complain.
Means testing the allocation of social benefits is resisted by governments because it is 
divisive, open to corruption—and plain difficult. But if money is tight, its introduction 
may be the price of providing assistance to those who are in real poverty. The World 
Bank estimates the proportion of the poorest households receiving cash benefits to vary 
from 25% in Poland to 95% in Hungary. Research funded by the Local Government 
and Public Service Reform Initiative in Armenia, “the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia,” and Moldova found that many very poor households were excluded from 
entitlements by bureaucratic hurdles such as the difficulty of people moving into towns 
getting certificates of residence, or of obtaining evidence of previous employment when 
both the enterprise and its owner, the former Yugoslavian state, have been disbanded. 
The Russian report cites the need to queue for a mountain of documents as a deterrent 
to the claim of housing allowances.
Again the crisis is beginning to promote attempts to target benefits more precisely. 
Some Romanian cities, including Bucharest, have abolished subsidies to heating com-
panies, replacing them with means-tested subsidies to individual consumers. Chisinau 
has started to means test public transport subsidies.
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The Boundaries of the State
The severity of the crisis in some countries and its abruptness everywhere have stimu-
lated a welcome concern to reinforce accountability and improve the productivity of 
local budgets.
These responses do not, however, challenge the underlying nature or scope of what 
local government is trying to do—simply its ways of doing and funding it.
Yet such challenges will arise if the crisis is even more severe or long lasting than 
currently forecast. Predictions tend to be based on the experience of past recovery from 
recession, not on hard current evidence. Given the accumulating levels of public debt, 
long-term demographic trends, and the responses needed to global warming, a return 
to previous levels of public service cannot be taken for granted.
Much of what government, national and local, now provides its citizens was the 
responsibility of communities and families before the Second World War. Turning the 
clock back is hard to imagine; abandoning mass literacy and letting old people shiver 
to death in winter are not conceivable options.
But burdens could be shared to a greater extent. Means testing has already been 
mentioned. Another option is the greater involvement of civil society in the provision 
of welfare. Partnership between local government and nongovernmental organisations 
is common in Europe, aided by the growing numbers of retired people who are still 
physically fit and potentially active. But there are still countries where NGOS are seen 
as threats rather than allies, and also where “volunteering” is associated with memories 
of totalitarian coercion. 
These attitudes of mind are neither healthy nor affordable. It is true that they 
are often associated with societies where family solidarity remains a stronger support 
for the aged, infirm, and unemployed than in Western Europe. But in an ageing and 
urbanising society family support can no longer be taken for granted. Voluntary care 
can be subsidised and supported, such as by “respite breaks” for family carers or petrol 
allowances for volunteer drivers. Public funding of public services is not all or nothing.
The downturn challenges both the public expectation that the state should provide 
for everything and the politicians’ pretence that they can. Modern technology offers more 
and more interactive processes. Perhaps it is the model for postcrisis local government.
Finally, we return to the boundaries within the state. The downturn has demon-
strated the dependence of local fiscal fortunes on differences in national policy. But this 
should not be exacerbated by a deliberate or instinctive recentralisation of authority. The 
responses outlined above call for more local flexibility and discretion, not less. The case 
for the principles and provisions of the European Charter of Local Self-Government 
remains intact. 
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ii) The Impact of the Economic Downturn 
 on Local Government in Europe: 
 What Is Happening and 
 What Can Be Done?6 
1. Overview 
(See the introduction to Chapter II.)
2. Comparative Analysis of European Local 
 Budgets in Crisis 
At the end of 2009, it is still rather early to gauge the full impact of the global economic 
crisis on the local budgets in all European countries. First, the events are still unfolding, 
with a lot of correction changes scheduled by governments for 2010, while data on local 
budget execution are notoriously hard to produce in real time. The figures presented 
in this chapter are based on Eurostat, plus information collected first-hand through a 
network of local operators and Council of Europe partners, in order to be able to il-
lustrate local government budgets broken down by their main components. Second, 
subnational financial arrangements differ tremendously from country to country, and so 
do the official reporting templates for the local/regional budgets execution, the degree 
of data centralization, or the time-lag with which they are made available tothe public, 
even among EU member states. Therefore, the results referring to recent periods should 
be regarded as preliminary: the task to integrate everything into a comparative format 
is time consuming and successive revisions have been necessary as the team continues 
to receive information from the local operators.
Nevertheless, a number of patterns seem to emerge that enable us to formulate 
tentative conclusions, most of which are summarized and discussed in the other 
chapters of this report. At the beginning of 2009, it seemed that the financial crisis hit 
6 The original Report by the Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative and the Council 
of Europe was presented at the Ministerial Conference as document MCL16(2009)Inf 1.
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disproportionately the public budgets of the western and central parts of the continent, 
and less the eastern-most ones. While the continental local governments were better off 
in 2008 compared with 2007—with the notable exception of Iceland, where inflation 
eroded all budgets—only in Central and Eastern Europe did local revenues continue 
to increase in nominal terms in the first quarter of 2009. 
However, this trend did not last long and the full 2009 execution altered the picture 
completely: some new member states (the Baltic states, Hungary, Bulgaria) or nonmem-
bers (Russia, Ukraine, the Balkans) have witnessed a dramatic combination of surging 
inflation and nominal shrinking of local finance (Figure 1). The same happened in old 
member states such as Germany and Portugal, where for various reasons the central 
governments probably did not transfer funds to compensate the local governments for 
their revenues losses, unlike in other hard-hit countries (Spain, Greece). 
Overall, the landscape is very uneven across countries when looking at the European 
local budgets: from financial collapse in the Baltic states, CIS, and Western Balkans, 
to managed cuts in some new members states and Germany, to buoyancy or at least 
resilience in the rest of the continent. 
There are two competing explanations for this: the happy scenario is that local 
finance will survive the crisis better than expected, due to the relative stability of the 
local revenue sources and the timely compensation transfers introduced by central 
governments. The alternative, unhappy scenario is that there may be only a time-lag 
between the moment the crisis hits the local economy and the moment when this is 
felt in the local tax collection:
  • Many own or shared taxes are tied with indicators reflecting last years’ per-
formance, and therefore the yield will decline in subsequent quarters (e.g., 
property, personal income tax, or local business tax in countries). 
  • Real estate transaction fees, a source that presumably reacted quickly to the 
crisis, in sync with the respective market, did not represent a very high fraction 
of the local revenues in the countries surveyed.
  • Our data collection itself involves a time-lag, and therefore the picture might 
worsen as we receive information from the 2010 execution. 
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Figure 1.
Trends in Local Revenues (All Tiers Combined) and Inflation
Which scenario prevails will probably depend on the length of the crisis and the 
margin of manoeuvre each national government has in applying stimulus packages and 
compensating local governments for lost revenues. From this perspective, it is better to 
be cautious for the moment: the end of the crisis it is not yet in sight, in spite of the 
recent positive signs of recovery in industry; the few data we have at this point from the 
beginning of 2010 seem to support the unhappy scenario (local revenues getting worse); 
and most countries, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, already run substantial 
structural budget deficits, which do not allow their governments to be very generous 
with handouts and transfers. It is therefore possible that the European local budgets 
display a positive dynamic in the first stages of the financial crisis, only to collapse later, 
squeezed from below by slowly increasing social expenditure and declining own revenues, 
and from above by the reduced possibilities of the central government assistance. If so, 
2010 may represent the peak of the crisis for the local communities (Figure 2).
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Figure 2.
Stages of the Crisis and Local Budget Revenues
Going back to Figure 1 and analyzing it in more detail, a number of observations can 
be made. Apart from what happened in old member states, the crisis hit with extreme 
severity in early 2009 the local budgets in the Baltic states (Estonia) and some Western 
Balkan states, with nominal decline in revenues of more than 10%. To a less extent, 
this is true for Moldova and for the upper tier of the Russian subnational authorities 
(the “federal subjects”). However, these are nominal figures. 
If we also take into consideration the inflation rate in 2008–2009, the general situ-
ation looks much worse: the net loss in Russia, Ukraine, Serbia, or Iceland is dramatic. 
In fact, the countries where local revenues increased in real terms in the first quarter of 
2009 are very few, and, for some of the rest, governments intervened with central grants 
or fiscal policy changes over the course of the year. The overall picture is that, across 
the region, local governments struggle to maintain the previous levels of expenditure, 
which is eroded by inflation and the economic slowdown. 
The crisis has generated a major shock not only in the budgets as such, but also 
in the expectations of local decision-makers and budget planners. Successive years of 
growth—or impressive growth, in CEE and SEE—in revenues, notably those deriv-
ing from taxes on individual or commercial property, personal income, or corporate 
revenues, have left local government people unprepared for the downturn. While in 
2008 the local revenues were higher than in the previous year in almost all the countries 
covered by the analysis (Figure 1), only a few months later the picture changed and the 
local budgets turned into the red. Having to shift from planning spending increases to 
negotiating budget cuts requires a traumatic change of mindset.
Local government revenues
(real terms)
2008, financial crisis 2009 economic crisis,
divergent budget trends
2010, full crisis in
public budgets
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On the one hand, this change may help focus the attention on efficiency and per-
formance management, objectives often honoured more often in words than in deeds. 
With less resources available, decision-makers have now to face the tough choices they 
might have avoided in the years of plenty. In this sense, the crisis may also represent an 
opportunity to speed up reforms, in those places where they are needed. On the other 
hand, there is no guarantee that reductions in staff or other reallocations of resources, 
implemented in haste in a year of crisis, will be optimal for the service provision. 
Figure 3.
Trends in National and Local Revenues in 2009 and 2008, in Percent
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There are reasons for optimism in local communities due to the fact that in most of 
the countries surveyed, the budget crunch of 2009 did not affect them disproportion-
ately. With the exception of Estonia, Hungary, and Germany, the central government 
was hit hardest and local budgets comparatively less, as Figure 3 shows: the latter grew 
more, or declined less than the former, and so the differential in dynamics plays in 
their favour. There are even situations when in the first quarter of the year the revenues 
to the central budget declined, while those to the local budgets continued to increase 
(Hungary, Romania, Croatia, Armenia; or France and the UK in the previous year). 
This trend appears to support a “generous government’s hypothesis”, i.e., that national 
treasuries reacted quickly to compensate through emergency transfers the losses at the 
local level, save for the three exceptions mentioned. Or it may be just that revenues at 
the local level are by comparison more volatile.
Both explanations may be true. There is evidence that in most places the central 
transfers were indeed bolstered; but also that central budgets were more exposed to the 
first stages of the crisis, relying to a larger extent on corporate and indirect taxes, or 
other contributions tied more directly to the level of economic activity. Nevertheless, a 
note of caution is necessary, as this situation may not last for much longer:
  • The local revenues may decline later on (the time-lag effect mentioned).
  • Even when central governments manage to overcompensate losses at the local 
level (transfers larger than the drop in revenues), these extra funds are usually 
earmarked. As a result, the local budget may be larger, but the autonomy in 
deciding how to spend it is more limited. It would be most unfortunate if the 
local autonomy ends up as a collateral victim of the drive to protect the local 
service provision against the vagaries of the crisis.
A downturn is obvious in large countries like Germany, Ukraine, and Russia (Figures 
1 and 3), both at the central and local levels in the first case, and especially at the federal 
level in the second. Otherwise, by and large the local budgets followed the trend from 
the beginning of the year, just growing at a slower pace (Poland, Romania, Russia). This 
happened both in countries where the GDP held steady (Poland) and in those where 
a severe contraction was registered (Romania, with –7.2%). In Russia, if the upper tier 
of subnational governments is taken out of the picture (the “federal subjects”), local 
governments proper have witnessed small increases in revenues over the first half of 
2009 and stagnation later. 
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Figure 4.
Local Financial Autonomy before the Crisis: Own Revenues in Total (2008)
In other countries, such as Slovakia, substantive policy changes that occurred after 
the start of 2009 make the situation hard to compare with the previous period (reas-
signment of revenue sources downwards, or a boost in capital spending). Nevertheless, 
difficult as it is to generalize based on such a small number of cases, the trend after the 
first quarter seem to be downwards, at least in the larger countries.
The vulnerability of local budgets does not depend on their degree of financial 
autonomy prior to the crisis, as Figure 4 indicates. We find countries hit hard by the 
crisis at both ends of the scale. In Estonia, Serbia, or Finland, local budgets rely more 
on own revenues and were badly hurt by the economic downturn, as common sense 
would suggest. However, in Russia, Ukraine, or Republika Srpska, local government 
budgets rely predominantly on grants and shared taxes, but still this has not prevented 
them from declining. On the other hand, those in the Czech Republic, Romania, or 
Poland did not suffer too much. Since there is no obvious correlation of this effect with 
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the GDP decline in 2009, we may conclude as a hypothesis that it is not the sheer reli-
ance on transfers that insulate local budgets from the effects of the crisis, but probably 
a good combination of sources and the strength of contractual arrangements defining 
the intergovernmental finance: multiyear and formula-based transfers appear to offer 
more stability (as well as more accountability) to local communities, which is the case 
in the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia.
Figure 5.
Trends by Type of Local Revenue in 2009 and 2008
There is little surprise in the results displayed in Figure 5: the trends by type of local 
revenue follow more or less what the theory predicts:
  • Local business taxes and the shares of the corporate profit tax fell quickly at the 
beginning of 2009 (Germany, Poland, Czech Republic, Russia, Serbia, Finland), 
unless they were tied to lagging indicators (Hungary), in which case the effect 
was delayed. The regions suffer most from this volatility (as Figure 6 also shows), 
since CIT shares tend to be a source assigned to this tier.
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  • Proceeds from the VAT shares (or other sales taxes), common in the ex-Yugoslav 
states (Croatia, Serbia, Republika Srpska) also marked a steep decline.
  • Personal income tax proved to be more resilient in the first stages of the crisis, 
with the notable exception of the Baltic states, where unemployment shot up 
and this was reflected in the public budgets. If Europe will avoid a massive surge 
in unemployment, this would be especially good news for local governments: 
not only that social expenditure will be contained, but an important source 
of general-purpose funds (PIT) will continue to provide resources, helping 
to preserve not only the size of the budgets as such, but also some margin of 
manoeuvre at the local level. However, toward the end of 2009 the PIT yield 
declined in Central Europe, too (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Germany), 
which makes this trend an interesting one to be monitored in 2010.
  • With the exception of some Balkan states, the property tax has held well in the 
crisis so far. However, there may be problems in the future with payments from 
companies, especially in countries where they are able to reassess the property 
value on their books (as in Romania): there is a strong temptation to do so when 
managers face a cash flow shortage, which creates tensions between businesses 
and the local government. On the other hand, in Russia and Ukraine there is 
evidence that the local governments proactively shifted the fiscal burden toward 
companies, by increasing the rates or the collection effort. Another problem 
may appear in those countries (UK) where a policy exists to help lower-income 
groups pay their taxes: while the tax collection may look good on paper, the 
yield incorporates a higher fraction of social support, also paid by the public 
authorities, and therefore the net gain is much reduced.
  • Again, unsurprisingly, own revenues from the use of assets or other local sources 
(local fees and duties) went down almost everywhere.
Figure 6 differentiates the impact of the crisis by tier of subnational government. 
Again, we face the problem of the small number of countries in which the 2009 data allow 
such a breakdown. Nevertheless, the point made above about the greater vulnerability 
of upper tiers is confirmed: German Länder, Polish regions, and the Russian “federal 
subjects” were hit hardest in their own revenues, most likely because the mix of sources 
at this level makes collection more volatile. The same happened in Romania (though by 
not having regions, its upper-level local governments are not directly comparable with 
the others), and it may have happened in Slovakia, had the government not reassigned 
an important road tax to the regional level in 2009 (hence, the increase). 
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Figure 6.
Trends by Subnational Tier, 2009/2008
It is also clear that in most cases the central governments have indeed used grants 
to compensate losses at the local level, and this may explain to a large extent the rela-
tive resilience of local budgets in crisis visible in Figure 3. This happened obviously in 
Poland, Romania, and Russia; in Germany, the picture is not clear, with some help for 
the Länder and net cuts for lower tiers. What is important to note, however, is the fact 
that, depending on the strings attached to these compensation funds, the emergency 
transfers may imply a reduction in the decision-making autonomy at this level. 
Another group of countries went the other way, cutting transfers for subnational 
governments: in Slovakia, because of the tax reassignment mentioned; in Ukraine, 
Hungary, or Bulgaria, probably due to the financial constraints at the central level. 
The data available so far do not allow us to tell if such examples are exceptions, or only 
announce a more general trend in 2010. In any case, local communities have fewer in-
struments to protect themselves against downturns and are very dependent on national 
policy changes. Therefore, further attention and monitoring are necessary to make sure 
that the financial burden of the crisis, which fell until now mostly on the shoulders 
of central governments, is not suddenly shifted toward local governments in the 2010 
budget cycle or subsequently. 
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3. Local Capital Investments
3.1. Impact of the Economic Downturn on Municipal Investments
In assessing the consequences of the economic downturn for local government invest-
ments three basic questions will be answered:
 i) How important are the local government capital investments in the public 
sector?
 ii) What was the scope and trend of municipal capital expenditures during the 
past year?
 iii) How did the local own source capital revenues change in this period?
3.1.1. Signiﬁcance of Local Investments
Local government capital investments do matter for the economy. Including fixed capital 
formation and capital transfers, they represent 1.5% of GDP in the European Union 
member states. (Table 1.) However, this seemingly low share is more than half of the 
total general government capital investments. 
There are obviously huge variations in the weight of local investments between 
countries (4%–77%), depending on the scope and form of decentralization and also 
on the actual methods of financing local capital investments. The first consequence of 
economic downturn is also visible: compared to 2007 the share of local investments 
declined from 60% to 56% in 2008. (This fall was occurred before significant govern-
ment programs were launched.) It might be the reason why CEMR already called the 
national governments’ attention to the need for empowerment and partnership with 
the regional and local governments.7 The proposed “local and regional new deal” would 
mean protection of their financial bases, carrying out municipal social protection func-
tions, and being involved in stopping the crisis. 
3.1.2. Declining Local Capital Expenditures
Our survey in 2009 showed that fiscal austerity measures decreased subnational capital 
investments. Comparative data on local government capital investments were available 
from 13 countries. There are huge variations in changes: in some countries there was still 
7 CEMR, The Athens Communiqué, 24 March 2009.
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some increase (Finland: 7%, Luxembourg: 18%, Sweden: 8%, Croatia, Poland: 11%), 
while in most of the others contraction—from 6% (Ukraine) to 90% (Armenia)—was 
very visible in the first quarter of 2009. (Table 2.) 
Table 1.
Local Investments as a Percentage of General Government Public Investment
Country 2007 2008 Local in % of GDP (2008)
1. Italy 78.3% 77.3% 1.7
2. Netherlands 69.7% 72.7% 2.4
3. France 72.7% 71.9% 2.3
4. Portugal 65.2% 71.4% 1.5
5. Ireland 72.7% 68.5% 3.7
6. Finland 64.0% 68.0% 1.7
7. Denmark 70.6% 66.7% 1.2
8. Slovakia 57.9% 61.1% 1.1
9. Germany 53.3% 60.0% 0.9
10. Latvia 49.1% 59.2% 2.9
11. Poland 61.0% 58.7% 2.7
12. Sweden 54.8% 54.5% 1.8
13. United Kingdom 55.6% 52.2% 1.2
14. Austria 50.0% 50.0% 0.5
15. Slovenia 48.6% 47.6% 2.0
16. Hungary 44.4% 46.4% 1.3
17. Romania 47.4% 46.3% 2.5
18. Luxembourg 38.2% 46.2% 1.8
19. Belgium 50.0% 43.8% 0.7
20. Estonia 40.7% 42.9% 2.4
21. Lithuania 32.7% 40.8% 2.0
22. Czech Republic 46.8% 39.6% 1.9
23. Bulgaria 37.5% 35.7% 2.0
24. Spain 31.6% 28.9% 1.1
25. Greece 20.0% 20.7% 0.6
26. Cyprus 20.0% 20.0% 0.6
27. Malta 5.0% 3.7% 0.1
EU (27 countries) 60.0% 55.6% 1.5
Source: Eurostat, Government Statistics.
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Table 2.
Changes in Local Capital Investments
1. Albania Capital expenditures: Q1 of 2009/2008: 52%
 Q2 of 2009/2008: 152%
2. Armenia Funds for capital investments: 2008/2007: 73%
 Q1 of 2009/2008: 10%
3. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
Capital expenditures: Q1 of 2009/2008: 91%
4. Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina
Capital expenditures: Entity (2008/2007): 122%
 Municipal sample 39%-172%
5. Croatia Capital expenditures: Q1 of 2009/2008 111%
6. Denmark Capital expenditures: 2009/2008 87%
7. Estonia Capital expenditures: Q1 of 2009/2008 80%
 Q2 of 2009/2008 82%
8. Finland Capital expenditures: Q1 of 2009/2008 106%
 Q2 of 2009/2008 106%
9. Germany Capital expenditures: Q1 of 2009/2008: 
 Local governments: 98%
 Lander (states) 217%
10. Hungary Capital expenditures: Q1 of 2009/2008 78%
11. Latvia Capital expenditures: Q1 of 2009/2008 61%
 Q2 of 2009/2008 72%
12. Luxembourg Gross capital formation: Q1 of 2009/2008 118%
13. Netherlands Capital investments: Q1 of 2009/2008 83%
 Q2 of 2009/2008 99%
14. Poland Capital expenditures: Q1 of 2009/2008 103%
 Q2 of 2009/2008 111%
15. Portugal Investments: Q1 of 2009/2008 97%
 Q2 of 2009/2008 108%
16. Romania Capital expenditures: Q1 of 2009/2008 80%
 Q2 of 2009/2008 67%
17. Sweden Gross capital formation: Q1 of 2009/2008 117%
 Q1 of 2009/2008 108%
18. Ukraine Capital expenditures:  Q1 of 2009/2008 94%
Source: Country reports. 
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However, these figures should be interpreted with caution. Only two years are com-
pared at the very beginning of the economic downturn, so the trends might be influenced 
by special factors, like the election cycle. Local capital spending is usually higher in an 
election year. Also the murky relations with public utility companies in South Eastern 
Europe might affect the level of capital expenditures in the fiscal reports. The public 
utility companies are mostly financed by municipal grants, through special municipal 
contracts, and the service organizations receive subsidies from the line ministries or na-
tional public investment programs. These expenditures are connected to local services, 
but they are rarely consolidated with the municipal capital budgets.
3.1.3. Drop in Local Own Source Capital Revenues 
Local capital expenditures are usually financed by municipal revenues, national budget 
transfers, and international development programs. Large-scale investments in local 
infrastructure, like utilities or roads, often do not appear in the local budgets. In the 
new EU member states, the local capital investments almost exclusively depend on the 
funds allocated through the various EU Operational Programmes. In other countries 
with rather centralized funding of local governments, the capital revenues are minimal 
and they are usually treated as residuals after the current budget expenditures are made.
The own source capital revenues are typically connected to local government property. 
In transition countries, after receiving the former state-owned assets or benefiting from 
privatization revenues, these own source capital revenues usually diminish. The cash-
strapped local governments do not invest these cascading revenues, so they are often 
used for current budget purposes.
In the case of Armenia, one of the reasons for a sharp decrease in municipal capital 
investments was the decreasing revenues from the sale of municipal land. In the period 
of 2004–2006, state-owned land located in the administrative territory of the munici-
palities was transferred to the municipalities. Sale of these assets was the main source of 
municipal capital budgets in 2007 and 2008, so by now only a small fraction of these 
assets remained.
Local capital revenues are rarely separated from the current budgets and it is not 
clearly regulated which should be considered as a capital revenue (e.g., the construc-
tion land fee in Serbia). The concept of distinct local government development funds 
is being introduced in some countries only in recent years, as in the case of the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 2008.
The surveyed countries report declining municipal capital revenues (mostly lower 
asset sales). (Table 3.) 
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Table 3.
Changes in Local Government Capital Revenues
Country Capital revenues, period compared Percent Change
1. Armenia Asset sale 
2008/2007:
Q4/Q1 of 2008:
85%
69%
2. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
“Income on the ground of capital” (asset sale)
2008/2007: 
Q1 of 2009/2008: 
347%
123%
3. Bulgaria “Other non-tax revenues8” 
2008/2007: 81%
4. Croatia “Revenue from non-financial assets”
Q1 of 2009/2008: 61%
5. Czech Republic Capital revenues
2008/2007: 128%
6. Estonia Property sale
Q1 of 2009/2008: 56%
7. Georgia Capital revenues
2008/2007: 96%
8. Germany “Other capital related revenues” Q1 of 2009/2008:
Local government:
Länder (state):
92%
45%
9. Hungary Sale of assets, shares
Q1 of 2009/2008: 96%
10. Poland “Revenues from local government property”
Q1 of 2009/2008:
Q2 of 2009/2008:
93%
84%
11. Romania Capital revenues
Q1 of 2009/2008:
Q2 of 2009/2008:
31%
40%
12. Russia Q1 of 2009/2008:
Property sale:
Capital transfers:
51%
25%
13. Slovakia “Other capital revenues” (asset sale)
Q1 of 2009/2008:
Q2 of 2009/2008:
47%
33%
14. “the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia”9
Capital revenues (asset sale)
2008/2007: 101%
15. Ukraine “Revenues from capital transactions”
Q1 of 2009/2008: 40%
Source: Country reports. 
8 Sales of property, rents, dividends, interests, concessions, donations, penalties, sanctions.
9 Sample of five cities.
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In countries with high remittances, the transfers from abroad could be important 
sources of local investments. Workers come home for the summer holidays and they pay 
their local taxes only in that period. They usually invest in housing, which would require 
basic amenities, sometimes helping municipal infrastructure development. According 
to past experiences, the remittances might increase in the first period of the economic 
crisis, when returning emigrants bring home their savings. So they could increase the 
investments and spending on local infrastructure.
3.2. Launching Stimulus Programs or Coping with Restrictions?
In Europe—both in the Eurozone and in the EU 27 countries—the GDP decline was 
2.5% in the first quarter of 2009 compared to 2008. It was even higher compared to 
the last months of the previous year, when the growth rates were negative: -1.6% in the 
euro area and -1.5% in the EU27.10 The American economy showed the same decrease in 
this period. National fiscal policies have to respond to this decline for two basic reasons: 
firstly, because public spending is an important factor of economic development and 
secondly, simply because of the shrinking tax revenues the former expenditure targets 
cannot be met. 
As the OECD survey in 2009 showed that in the developed countries significant 
economic recovery programs had been started by the governments.11 In the period 2008–
2010, the budget impact of the average stimulus packages totaled of 2.5% of the GDP, 
mostly concentrating on fiscal year 2009. The Economic Recovery plan of the European 
Union also targeted a coordinated fiscal impulse of the member states’ budget (1.2%) 
and of the EU funding (0.3%) for the year 2009.12
These fiscal measures are usually directed at both public spending and public rev-
enues. The majority of the OECD member countries launched supportive fiscal packages 
for the period of 2008–2010. Almost half of the measures will be implemented in the 
fiscal year 2009. The fiscal policies target government spending, which is planned to be 
increased (1.5% of GDP in 2008), but tax revenues will decrease (an estimated 1.9%) 
as well. On the expenditure side, the fiscal programs typically focus on infrastructure 
development and active labor market measures are introduced. On the revenue side of 
the budget, a reduction of the national tax burden, primarily personal income taxes, 
is planned. 
10 Eurostat (STAT/09/70) report.
11 OECD Economic Outlook, 2009, Interim Report, Chapter 3. The Effectiveness and Scope of Fiscal 
Stimulus.
12 A European Economic Recovery Plan (COM(2008) 800 final), 2008.
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However, some countries might not benefit from these fiscal policy actions. When 
their economy is dependent on exports then the economic boom in their partner 
countries is what really matters. If there is a high budget deficit coupled with a current 
account deficit, then the room for these domestic fiscal policy measures is limited. 
High external debt would require also public sector restrictions and leave no space for 
economic stimulus programs.13  So the fiscal measures very much depend on the overall 
economic and fiscal status of the country.
Also it is widely accepted that the increase in spending should be short-term and 
focused. The “automatic stabilizers,” such as the social benefit programs, will create de-
mand, but should phase out with economic recovery.14 The OECD already started to 
communicate the importance of the exit strategy after the crisis. It is emphasized, that 
recovery measures could be made only according to the long-term fiscal policy objectives. 
3.3. Local Options for Increasing Capital Investments
Local governments in the period of economic downturn are faced with two types of 
challenges in the area of capital investments: 
 (i) Whether they are involved in the economic stimulus programs at all? 
 (ii) How they can cope with the consequences of restrictions in the general  
government budget? 
Local governments might face these two different problems at the same time, 
when the special countercyclical national funds, the new allocation mechanisms of 
these grants, are combined with the overall reduction in the usual sources of capital 
investment financing. Municipal responses to these two challenges were diverse in the 
countries studied, because the systems of intergovernmental finances, the level of local 
government autonomy and the extent of economic downturn vary. 
In evaluating the local responses, the following options will be discussed in greater 
detail:
 a) Competition for the available resources in the public budgets.
 b) Benefits of the external public funds, like the EU or other donors’ assistance.
 c) Increase in own source capital revenues, including funds received through vari-
ous forms of public-private partnership (PPP) schemes.
13 K. Ott (2009) Fiscal Destimulation Instead of Fiscal Stimulation. Zagreb: Institute of Public Finance.
14 A. Kraay and L. Serven (2008) Fiscal Policy Responses to the Current Financial Crisis: Issues for Develop-
ing Countries, Macroeconomics and Growth Research, The World Bank.
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 d) Municipal borrowing.
 e) Improving local project preparation and management.
 f ) Introducing indirect measures to create a favorable environment for local invest-
ments.
3.3.1. Competition for Public Funds
In some countries, the system of intergovernmental finances has built-in, automatic 
mechanisms to protect the local governments’ unified budgets from sudden and unex-
pected changes. In the case of Hungary, “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,” 
and Slovakia, the set rules of PIT or VAT sharing stabilize the local revenue flow. The 
local governments’ share is either legislated by the act on local government finances or 
there is a long-term political consensus on the “fair” share of local budgets. Sometimes 
the lack of accurate data also explains the delay; for example, in Hungary no exact in-
formation on PIT revenues is available in the period of fiscal planning (t-1), so revenues 
are shared with a two-year-delay (based on the actual PIT revenues in year t-2).
Special national funding schemes and public investments programs might also limit the 
scope of the national government’s discretion. The institutional interest of the agencies 
managing public investment programs (e.g., the funds allocated through the National 
Investment Plan in Serbia) or a special anticrisis commission allocating the available 
funds (Armenia) could be significant built-in breaks for restrictions. The national as-
sociations of local governments could also protect their members’ interest during the 
budget negotiation process to avoid leaving their members out of the economic recovery 
programs (Bulgaria).
In the more developed economies of Western Europe significant economic stimulus 
programs have been launched. In France, the new finance law for 2009 legislated a recov-
ery program equal to 1.3% of GDP. Local governments benefit from these extra funds by 
receiving compensation for the VAT on new local capital investments; loans are provided 
for local government projects or for public-private partnerships and special programs 
(e.g., digital schools in rural municipalities). In Norway, local governments received 
one-third of the 20 billion krone national package mostly for capital investments in 
infrastructure. The UK government funding for local authorities aimed primarily at 
increasing employment and housing development.
All these funding mechanisms might be subject to competition for public revenues. 
Rearrangement and centralization of public sector revenues is always an option for the 
national governments. In Serbia, where the cutback in local grants was severe (37% in 
the middle of the fiscal year), there is a competition for the potential revenues from pri-
vatisation of local public utility companies. These companies manage marketable assets 
(like land, buildings), so they could raise one-time capital revenues for the future owners. 
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But local governments also follow similar policies toward their service organizations 
by lowering their subsidies or forcing them to borrow for funding capital investments 
(without issuing local government guarantees).
3.3.2. Better Access to External Resources
In countries eligible for European Union structural and cohesion funds or other pro-
grams available for candidate countries or external partners, the EU is a significant 
source of financing local capital investments. Several nonmember countries reported 
new activities in information sharing and awareness raising, which would improve the 
local governments’ access to IPA funds in the Balkans and other twinning, cross-border, 
and national government cooperation programs (e.g., TAIEX) as well. 
In the case of the new member countries, EU structural and cohesion funds are the 
single largest sources of future municipal capital investments. (Table 4.) The new EU 
member states developed various methods for efficient use of the EU funds. Special 
intermediary funds were set up in Bulgaria, and Estonia, and the application and purchas-
ing contracting procedures have been simplified (Estonia and Romania). In Poland, the 
government is committed to supporting the prefinancing of EU projects and accelerat-
ing the funding of large local infrastructural programs. In Greece, a special nonprofit 
organization has been set up to assist those small municipalities that do not have the 
appropriate skills for preparing projects for EU structural funds.
The European Commission has also accelerated the implementation of the programs 
financed by the structural funds. The funds for prefinancing of EC projects has been 
increased and member states should enhance the part financed by the Community 
and should bring forward the implementation of major investment projects, simplify-
ing the treatment of advances paid to the beneficiaries.15 New calls for proposals will 
be launched in four areas: (i) energy; (ii) infrastructure, transportation, and water (iii) 
green technology, and (iv) Internet infrastructure. The national authorities should pay 
their suppliers on time (in 30 days). Restrictions on State Aid will be temporarily eased.
It is critical to improve the EU fund absorption capacity of the national administra-
tions. The secondary regulations are often stricter and more complicated than those of 
the European Union, partly because the national governments want to protect themselves 
from corruption charges. However, in reality the more complicated rules increase the 
risk of corruption.
15 A European Economic Recovery Plan (COM(2008) 800 final), 2008.
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Table 4.
Actions to Improve Access to EU Funds
1. Federation
of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
IPA, Taiex, Twinning programs: awareness raising, capacity development, 
decrease cofinancing, easing project requirements, adjusting local projects 
to IPA requirements.
2. Bulgaria Fund for Local Authorities and Governments (FLAG), partially funded 
by EBRD loan to assist EU project design and implementation.
3. Estonia EU Funds reallocated through special funds for countercyclical purposes. 
Application process eased and accelerated. 
4. Greece Establishment of the DEMOS S.A., a nonprofit organization to assist 
the municipalities in preparing proposals for EU structural funds offer. 
Preparation of 4-year action plans for the municipalities with populations 
below 10,000.
5. Hungary EU funded projects’ construction work tenders are up by 57% in Q1 2009, 
compared to Q1 2008.
6. Ireland Significant reductions in tender prices; delivering large part of the National 
Development Plan of 2007–2013 within the envisaged timescale.
7. Poland Simplification of procedures, assisting the small municipalities to submit 
proposals.
8. Romania Making public procurement procedures more efficient (in managing 
complaints, shortening the process).
9. Serbia IPA Funds redirected to national budget.
10. Slovakia EU Funds are major sources, but planning and project design capacity 
varies; regions and cities have qualified staff.
11. Ukraine Further decreasing cofinancing requirements for CBC programs 
(2004/2006: 10%); pressure for high quality projects within the consortia; 
lack of fiscal regulations for accounting and managing EU funds.
Source: Country reports.
3.3.3. Increasing Own Capital Revenues
Most of the countries reported declining or stagnating local government capital revenues. 
(Table 3.) Asset sale and privatisation does not work in the crisis period, when there is 
an overall lack of investment funds and the property prices are declining.
Private contribution to public sector investments has stopped as well. Despite the 
advantages of PPP deals there is a general resistance toward this earlier much-praised 
method of financing infrastructure and urban development. One-quarter of globally 
surveyed PPP projects are facing difficulties, either being delayed or canceled, despite 
the fact that they were at an advanced stage of raising finance. This trend is expected to 
continue; however, some countries like France reported no long-term reduction in the 
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number or volume of public private partnership. There is a demand for these innovative 
projects, but the share of the public sector has to be increased, when the private sector 
has limited access to funds.16 
3.3.4. Local Borrowing 
Loan financing of capital investment projects is regarded as one of the feasible options 
to keep local government infrastructure development afloat. Studies of the possible 
ways to recover from economic crisis showed that in countries with low public debt the 
municipal borrowing might be a fast response with high multiplier affect for stimulat-
ing economic growth through fiscal expansion.17 Subsidized loans might further help 
specific investments (e.g., for energy savings) as well.
However, as the present crisis originated from the financial sector, the loans are not 
easily available on the market. The traditional communal banks were also hit by the 
crisis.18 Despite this situation some of the surveyed countries still showed considerable 
increase in local government borrowing (Table 5). 
Interestingly the new EU member countries actively used this method of financing, 
partly to raise funds for cofinancing and prefinancing the projects funded by the EU. 
These are the countries, which already have proper regulations on municipal borrowing 
and the rules of potential consolidation for defaulting local governments are set and 
tested. In France, a special company for financing the French economy (SFEF) provides 
guarantees and loans for local governments. Consequently, in the last quarter of 2008, 
municipal borrowing increased by 4.9%, while loans in general only grew by 1.4%. 
Ukraine reported amendment of borrowing regulations, making the sale of securities 
possible and relaxing debt limit regulations. 
The forms of local government borrowing have been transformed as well. The 
former bank loans are being gradually supplemented by a new wave of bond issuance. 
It has been actively promoted in transition countries for many years, but now urban 
local governments have started to use this instrument again. Large cities in the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, and Poland issue bonds more actively, because no public procurement 
16 P. Desilets (2009) PPPs Projects and Financial Crisis: Short-Term Impacts and Medium-Term Trends. 
Institute for Public-Private Partnerships, Inc.
17 In the case of China, the East Asian crisis was partly managed by lifting the constraints on subnational 
borrowing through allowing municipal loans with a size of 1% of GDP. http://econ.worldbank.org/
WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/EXTPROGRAMS/EXTMACROECO/0,,co
ntentMDK:22058212~pagePK:64168182~piPK:64168060~theSitePK:477872,00.html#Notes_7.
18 Like Kommunalkredit (Austria), Kommunalkreditt (Norway), or Dexia. See CEMR survey in March 
2009.
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regulations apply and there is a stable market for private placement (usually by the local 
governments’ own commercial banks). Other countries like Serbia are in the process of 
developing supportive regulations for municipal bond financing. 
Table 5. 
Changes in Local Government Borrowing
Country Period compared Percent change
1. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
2008/2007 164%
2. Bulgaria 2008/2007 54%
3. Croatia Q1 of 2009/2008
Local government borrowing 
55%
Local government lending to public utility companies 246%
4. Czech Republic Municipal debt: 2008/2007 101%
5. Denmark 2009/2008 37%
6. Finland Loans
Q1 of 2009/2008 
112%
7. Hungary Q1 of 2009/2008 463%
8. Poland New debt
Q1 of 2009/2008
Q2 of 2009/2008
66%
280%
9. Romania Loans
Q1 of 2009/2008
Q2 of 2009/2008
125%
700%
10. Serbia Debt service 
Q1 of 2009/2008 126%
11. Slovakia Loans and credits
Q1 of 2009/2008
Q2 of 2009/2008
96%
540%
3.3.5. Improved Project Preparation and Management
The EU fund allocation mechanisms through the Operational Programmes forced lo-
cal governments to prepare capital investment projects, which fit into the hierarchical 
structure of regional development plans. This planning process was started well before 
the EU accession, so by now local governments, in addition to having general urban 
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and regional development plans, have designed a variety of projects, which can be easily 
adapted to the national funding priorities.
In the non-EU member countries, the various donor programs have prepared the new 
municipal projects. They are funded by a combination of revenues, including donor 
support, special credit lines, and support to domestic development banks. For example, 
in Serbia the Standing Conference for Towns and Municipalities has developed a web-
based information system assisting municipalities to develop the documentation for 
accessing development funds (SLAP).19 It is a database of infrastructure projects and 
requirements for financial support. SLAP enables municipalities to fill in data online, 
creates a scoring system, and makes project selection for the donors more transparent. 
The EU recovery plan puts a great emphasis on ﬁnancial management. Timely payment 
of public sector contractors and accelerated public procurement procedures (decreasing 
the time limit from 87 days to 30) for an interim period of the coming two years might 
speed up the implementation of the new projects. 
3.3.6. Indirect Measures for Improving Local Investments
Local governments in the transition countries are actively involved in economic develop-
ment. In the period of economic downturn, when large-scale foreign direct investment 
also slows down, more attention is paid to small- and medium-size enterprises. Local 
governments are able to do a lot to promote these businesses and keep the flow of in-
ward investments steady. 
Following the traditions of the former planned economy, municipal officials are 
actively involved in developing the local business environment. Obviously the regula-
tory framework is set by the national government. But there are municipal techniques 
that could have an impact on SME development: e.g., through a slight shift in funding 
from infrastructure projects to SME development (Hungary), subsidized interest rates 
for SMEs (Serbia), or government guarantees for SME loans (Republika Srpska/BiH). 
3.4. In Search of New National Policies
As can be seen from our survey, national governments are trying to develop new policies 
to minimize the impact of economic crisis at the local level. These measures are partially 
justified by the high share of local capital investments in the public sector and by the 
multiplier effect of local investments. The national government’s influence is limited by 
the overall fiscal constraints, which decrease the resources available for local governments 
in the form of transfers and shared and own source revenues. 
19 http://www.misp-serbia.rs/en/slap.php.
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Consequently, the local government responses to the declining revenues are very 
much defined by the forms and stage of decentralization in a specific country. In this 
respect, the most important factors are: (i) the scope of local government spending, 
(ii) the role of the national state in capital investment planning and financing, (iii) the 
availability of external official development assistance and the EU funds, and (iv) the 
municipal capacity to borrow and to manage debt. 
In the period of economic crisis and fiscal restriction, the most a democratically 
elected municipal leadership can do is to adjust local ﬁscal policies to the voters’ preferences 
by responding to the local priorities. Since 1980 three basic strategies have crystallized: 
(a) increasing public revenues through higher taxes, (b) cutting expenditures, and (c) 
improving service efficiency, primarily by focusing on cooperation with the private 
sector and using market-based incentives. This latter strategy resulted in the worldwide 
movement of alternative service delivery arrangements—starting from contracting out 
to complex forms of concessions—and the adaptation of the new public management 
to local public service provision and administration. 
Currently, however, there seems to be an overall move away from these methods. 
It is claimed that more power has to be allocated to the state as an owner, not just as a 
regulator; the market is regarded as a mechanism creating monopolies, further increas-
ing social inequalities. Following these arguments there are high hopes that stronger 
governments will be more effective and fairer. 
But, as some development economists argue, this would require a more transparent 
and less corrupt public sector.20 The desire for a “new deal” between different tiers of 
governments should be based on a combination of institutional reforms. The way local 
governments will respond to the present economic downturn does not really depend 
on short-term emergency measures. It is defined more by the strength of the local 
governments, and the institutions and procedures developed under the slowly evolving 
decentralization framework.
4. Improving Efﬁciency
4.1. Introduction
Making the most of more limited resources is likely to be an ongoing challenge. Im-
proving the efficiency and effectiveness of local government expenditure has many 
manifestations.
20 Kaufmann, http://www.thekaufmannpost.net.
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Country observers’ reports detail many efforts by individual local governments to 
reduce costs. These mainly apply to administrative overheads and include cuts in over-
time, bonuses, official entertainment, and telephone usage, while purchases of vehicles 
and furniture have been deferred and staff vacancies have been frozen. In Serbia, GPS 
systems have been fitted in municipal vehicles so that both drivers and town halls know 
where they are. Most are local initiatives, but some have been imposed. In the case of 
Romania, some efficiency measures have been mandated by government as conditions 
for national budget support by the European Union. In Latvia, municipal employees 
have shared a national 15% cut in public service pay, while Hungarian staff are losing 
their 13th-month bonus, and UK employees face a two-year pay freeze. 
Justified as they may be, these are temporary or one-off savings that do not greatly 
affect longer-term efficiency. This requires more fundamental examination of the practi-
cal ways in which services are run.
4.2. The Role of Benchmarking
There are three good examples of “value for money” approaches and performance 
audit systems developed over the last three decades under the umbrella of New Public 
Management:
 • “Value for money” assessments of individual authorities and services are under-
taken on a voluntary basis by the Danish Local Government Association, based 
like their British equivalents on disseminating the practice of those municipalities 
which perform well in a comparison of unit costs. 
 • Benchmarking individual service and administrative service costs carried out in 
Bulgaria by the Open Society Foundations in collaboration with the National 
Association of Municipalities, described in Annex I.
 • Performance standards measured by the Benchmarking Club of Hungarian water 
company managers, with the consultant help of the Regional Centre for Energy 
Policy Research at the Corvinus University of Budapest. The comparisons look 
at range of both technical and management issues. A fuller description is in 
Annex II.
These are all voluntary systems based on peer review. A “top downwards” approach 
has been adopted for over two decades by the English Audit Commission and parallel 
bodies in Scotland and Wales, which have developed comprehensive assessments of 
local government efficiency, although their recommendations are not binding on local 
authorities. The Russian Federation now requires local authorities to report annually 
on a range of performance measurements. 
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All these measurement systems have achieved substantial improvements by some if 
not all authorities. The standard criticism is that they focus undue attention on certain 
easily measurable aspects of performance at the possible expense of other aspects of quality.
4.3. Performance Audit
During the 1980s and as part of New Public Management reforms, several Western 
European countries extended their audit of both national and local government from 
a preoccupation with legality to the promotion of performance and efficiency. After 
1989, a number of Central European states like Hungary and Poland did the same.
In 2006, the Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative surveyed the 
audit of local government in 12 Eastern and South Eastern European states. It found 
that most states had an adequate legislative framework, much of it newly enacted with 
EU assistance, but implementation so far was weak:
 • Qualified auditors were in short supply in the public sector and as a result ac-
tual external audits infrequent. Inevitably the situation was worse in countries 
with large numbers of small authorities. (Only 84 out of 7,455 Romanian local 
government final accounts had been audited).
 • Audit was still largely concerned with legality and conformity with required 
procedure; performance and efficiency, though within its terms of reference, 
were rarely examined. Audit training in these aspects was often inadequate.
 • Public interest in audit findings was generally low, not aided by the customary 
opacity and circumspection of published reports.
The Council of Europe has been helping to develop performance audit capacity 
in a number of countries such as Bulgaria, Russia, and Serbia. The financial downturn 
emphasises the need.
4.4. Efﬁciency in Social Expenditures
In current economic circumstances, national and local policies seek to protect social 
expenditures, because of their heightened importance. Preserving present standards of 
social provision does not, however, mean preserving existing input levels or methods 
of spending; their efficiency should also come under review.
Local governments’ involvement in the social sector varies enormously, as does its 
freedom of action. Sometimes the allocation of responsibility itself creates incentives 
to high cost provision. For example, in a number of countries such as Hungary and 
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Ukraine, responsibilities for residential care for the elderly and infirm and hospital care 
lie with upper tiers of local government, while the municipalities provide domiciliary 
and primary health care. Funding of the upper-tier service may well be based on the 
numbers housed or treated. These arrangements may provide strong incentives to place 
social service clients in residential homes or patients in hospitals when it may be neither 
the most appropriate nor sympathetic response to their need. In most cases it is the 
more expensive solution.
The system of payment for services can also be a major source of inefficiency. Medi-
cal care costs, for example, can be inflated by a system of paying providers per admission 
or individual treatment. These can result in patients staying in hospital far longer than 
necessary or being subjected to inordinate numbers of blood tests. These perverse incen-
tives are widely recognised and systems like DRG funding have been designed to reduce 
them. But such reforms have not been universal and the crisis underlines their importance.
Other examples of excessive social sector costs abound. Schools with declining pupil 
populations, for example, frequently retain previous numbers of teaching staff while 
mandated contact hours with pupil are generously low.
4.5. Regulation of Expenditure
Local governments that would like to cut costs are frequently debarred by national 
regulation prescribing inputs rather than outcomes. This applies particularly in the 
countries that distinguish between the “autonomous” and “delegated” tasks of local 
government and place the more expensive services like education, social service, and 
health care in the latter category.
The Ukrainian report states the following:
  Delegated services are often regulated by detailed standards of provision and local 
government management subject to close supervision by sectoral ministries. Lo-
cal governments have very low discretion in allocating funds and administering 
respective programmes. Administrative decision-making (including facility-level 
budgeting) is subject to a rigid vertical structure of input norms, dictated by 
central line ministries. These norms are contained in ministerial guidelines dictat-
ing the amounts of staffing and other resources based on existing infrastructure 
inputs, but also in constitutional prohibition of closing facilities in healthcare and 
education. These norms are also the key principle behind budgeting at the facility 
level and negotiating these budgets with local governments. One consequence 
is imposition on local governments of vertically protected recurrent spending, 
including half of the total public wages. Some decisions on local approaches to 
service provision are also stimulated by incentives built in the transfer formula 
as described earlier. This input based budgeting, which permeates the system, 
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creates strong negative implications for technical and allocative efficiency in key 
sectors, where the quality of service delivery is deteriorating at dramatic rates.
Ukrainian local governments cannot close any grossly underutilised schools or social 
and cultural institutions without the permission of national ministries, frequently with-
held. Such institutions may well have lost their custom through changes in population 
or public preference.
The problem occurs more widely. It is typically exacerbated by the fact that the 
sectoral ministries concerned are not faced with the consequences of running uneco-
nomic services, since the financing of delegated services is usually governed solely by 
ministries of finance. 
Several national rapporteurs comment that failure to meet unsustainable service 
standards is widespread but tolerated. Others identify national insistence on observing 
the norms as a serious problem. Signatories of the European Charter should be ensuring 
that national ministries do not micromanage services entrusted to local government 
whether technically delegated or not.
4.6. Delegating Institutional Management
The same principle applies to the relations between local governments and their own 
subsidiary agencies and institutions.
When budgets have to be cut, it is usually their managers who know best where 
waste is occurring. It is only the school head who will bother that lights are switched 
off at the end of the day and only if the school budget keeps the savings.
Delegating budgets and their managements to service institutions is another aspect 
of New Public Management which is now widespread; per-pupil funding of schools is 
now widely adopted, for example.
These solutions, though timely in a period of recession, need careful introduction, 
however. Budget allocations need to take full account of exogenous variations in cost. 
Population density and social background have major impacts on school expenditure, 
for example. Audit and other forms of accountability must match degrees of financial 
delegation.
4.7. Local Government Audit
In 2007, the Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative commissioned 
reports on local government audit in 12 Eastern European countries. The countries 
covered were Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Georgia, Moldova, 
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Montenegro, Romania, Russia, Serbia, “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,” 
and Ukraine. Their findings are briefly summarised in the following paragraphs and sug-
gest the need for further reform before audit can play its full part in improving efficiency.
4.7.1. External Audit
Legal Requirements
External audit may be exercised by the following:
 • National audit institutions examining local budgets in full.
 • National audit institutions scrutinising the expenditure of earmarked state 
budget subsidies only. 
 • Private audit companies operating commercially.
In Bosnia and Herzogovina, Croatia, Romania, Serbia, and “the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia,” local governments are subject to comprehensive audit by the 
national audit organisations answerable to Parliament. These are states that possess or 
aspire to EU membership and the arrangement arises from recent reforms designed to 
conform with l’acquis communitaire. In Montenegro and Serbia, local councils may also 
hire parallel audits by commercial firms. Similar provisions exist in Moldova.
In Russia and Ukraine, the federal/national and republican/oblast audit chambers 
have powers to audit use of State Budget earmarked subsidies but not “own revenue.” 
There is also a vertical system of financial control within the executive hierarchy of finance 
departments—in Ukraine under the Chief Accounting and Audit Department of the 
Ministry of Finance (CCAD), which scrutinises local budgets in full. In Georgia, state 
audit only covers use of earmarked grants and elected council finance commissions are 
supposed to undertake or commission audit of the budget execution reports. Similar 
provision is made in Armenia but state audit extends to nonearmarked transfers, which 
effectively involves scrutinising all expenditure, since the source of funding cannot be 
distinguished.
In Azerbaijan, the national Chamber of Accounts may conduct an audit of an in-
dividual local government at the request of the Ministry of Justice, i.e., to investigate a 
specific complaint or suspicion of financial irregularity. Otherwise, local governments 
are required to arrange commercial audit of their budget execution reports.
The Practice
In several cases external audit is less satisfactory in practice than in law. The following 
are examples of apparently inadequate coverage at the time of the 2007 survey:
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 • Armenia: an average of 24 local governments audited annually out of 926.
 • Bosnia and Herzegovina: coverage of the Federation municipalities by the Audit 
Office has declined from 18 in 2002 to 1 in 2006.
 • Montenegro: 2 out of 21 municipalities audited to date.
 • Romania: 84 budget execution reports audited in 2006 out of 7,455.
 • Serbia: the State Audit Institution had not yet been constituted by Parliament.
A rotating national audit is covering approximately one-third of local government 
units per annum in Croatia and “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,” and one-
half in Republika Srpska. In Georgia, the reorganised municipalities only commenced 
financial operations in 2007.
In Georgia and Serbia, institutional arrangements for audit are new and their 
adequacy remains to be proved. Inadequacy elsewhere has been ascribed to the time 
and cost involved in deploying sufficient qualified staff and, in countries like Armenia 
and Romania, the territorial fragmentation which creates large numbers of small units 
requiring full audit procedures, however small their budgets.
4.7.2. Internal Audit
Legal Requirements
Local government units are required to establish internal audit units in Armenia, Croatia 
(in municipalities over 35,000 inhabitants, running primary education or employing 
over 50 staff), Romania (for budgets exceeding €10,000 p.a.), Serbia, and “the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” (over 15,000 inhabitants). In Russia and Ukraine, 
internal control sections form part of vertical hierarchies subordinate to the Ministry 
of Finance.
Elsewhere, Ministry of Finance regulations mandating internal audit are currently 
in draft in Moldova. In Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro, some municipalities 
have established internal audit sections voluntarily.
In Croatia, Romania, Serbia, and “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,” 
ministries of finance have established central harmonisation units to integrate the 
procedures and standards of internal audit throughout the public sector, and organise 
associated training. 
The Practice
As in the case of external audit, the practice in several cases fell short of the legal require-
ment at the time of the survey:
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 • By 2006, only 35% of Romanian authorities obliged to establish internal audit 
units had done so, and 85% of these had appointed only one staff member to 
them.
 • In Serbia, few municipalities (mainly in Belgrade and Vojvodina) had formed 
internal audit units.
 • In “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,” 20 units have so far been set 
up out of 42 mandated.
 • In Armenia, 34 out of 41 urban municipalities have established units but very 
few in rural areas.
 • In Croatia, most small municipalities buy in the county internal audit service.
Provision in countries like “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” for smaller 
municipalities to establish joint internal audit units or to buy in the services of larger 
towns have been largely ignored.
Shortfalls in provision have been ascribed variously to the cost or nonavailability of 
qualified staff, but also to the apathy of elected members or executives.
4.7.3. Scope of Audit
In all countries surveyed, such audit as takes place is primarily concerned with issues 
of regularity, i.e., of the compliance of financial transactions with laws and official pro-
cedures, and of the conformity of revenues and expenditures to budgets and budget 
variations approved by legislative bodies. 
In the Balkan countries, Georgia and, to some extent, Ukraine, audit is also ex-
pected, or at least authorised, to examine the utilisation of local budgets in terms of 
performance and eﬃciency. The country reports suggest that this mandate is largely 
ignored in practice. Audit staff and time are preoccupied with verifying regularity. Staff 
lack skills in scrutinising performance and efficiency, and there is little experience of 
doing so or popular demand. 
4.7.4. Access to Audit Reports
Reports by state audit institutions are normally submitted to Parliament. In most cases, 
however, copies are sent to the councils under scrutiny or are available on websites. 
The prime audience for external audit findings should be the elected council that 
approves the budget under scrutiny. It is less likely to pay attention to reports that are 
not specifically addressed to it, or where comments are lost in generalities applied to 
several or all local governments. 
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Ideally civil society should also have access to them since councils and their execu-
tives may well collude in mismanagement of public money. In practice, public access to 
external audit reports is more restricted in several of the countries surveyed. In Armenia, 
audit reports can only be accessed by application under the Freedom of Information 
law. In Azerbaijan, a list of audits undertaken is published on the website but results 
are not disclosed. In Russia and Ukraine, reports on budget execution are submitted to 
local councils but receive no publicity. There is no public access to reports in Moldova. 
Internal audit reports are almost invariably confidential and submitted to the chief 
executive except where specifically prepared for the Finance Commission, as in Georgia.
4.7.5. Human Resources
Most of the country studies describe a formalised structure of training and qualifications 
surrounding the staffing and operation of external audit institutions, whether state or 
private. They increasingly include membership of INTOSAI and adherence to IFAC 
standards. An exception is Georgia, where accreditation requirements for private audi-
tors were jettisoned in a general campaign for deregulation. 
The state bodies vary, however, in the adequacy of trained staffing numbers. The 
Romanian county branches are 50% below establishment, while the Serbian State Audit 
Institution still awaits practical formation. The problems relate principally to recruitment 
since the required accounting skills are generally better rewarded in the private sector.
Internal audit presents a greater challenge. Only larger and more urbanised local 
governments can attract and afford graduate professionals. In Russia the smaller and 
more rural municipalities cannot even afford to send staff on the training courses that are 
available to them. In countries like Croatia, Romania, and “the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia,” pre-accession reforms have inspired the creation of central units in the 
ministries of finance charged with “harmonising” standards of internal audit across the 
public sector as a whole. These are promoting capacity within local governments but 
the problems of affordability and career prospects remain.
4.7.6. Conclusions
Relatively strong legal frameworks for local government audit are now in place in most 
of the countries studied, particularly those in some stage of preparation for EU mem-
bership. Implementation, however, has barely started in Serbia and is weak generally. 
Many local governments have never seen an auditor, some only rarely.
Adequate audit is expensive, taking the time of staff who need to be well quali-
fied and well paid to stay in the public sector and work honestly and independently. 
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Countries with fragmented local government systems find it particularly difficult to 
provide both external and internal audit to a large number of small, mainly rural local 
bodies; they may be spending little money but the control procedures are the same for 
large and small. It could be argued that the absence of audit matters less in rural com-
munities where “everyone knows what’s going on”; but the realities of village politics 
may well shelter officials from the consequences of their misconduct, however obvious. 
Persuading small municipalities to share internal audit services with neighbours, towns, 
or counties is one answer.
The conclusion of the Russian study is that much audit is carried out, but no one 
takes any notice of its findings. This may be because of a suspicion that the purpose 
of audit is to maintain vertical power and punish independent-minded mayors rather 
than protect the public.
Audit suffers from the legacies of the communist past when it was seen as an in-
strument of vertical intrusion, driven as much by interpersonal relations within the 
hierarchy as by concerns for integrity and efficiency. In a democratic society effective 
audit is essential, not inimical to local autonomy, because it plays a vital part in secur-
ing public trust.
Audit needs to gain perceived value. For this it needs to be regular, not an apparently 
random and punitive intervention. Its findings need to be accessible to elected members 
and to civil society including the media. And it needs to be concerned with more than 
misconduct or inaccuracy, giving positive help to the improvement of performance 
and efficiency.
4.8. Energy Efﬁciency
One field to receive a boost as a result of the crisis has been the promotion of efficiency 
in energy consumption. 
The onset of the crisis coincided with lead-up to the 2009 Copenhagen Summit, 
when both governments and the public were acutely aware of environmental challenges 
and anxious to demonstrate their concern. As a result, much “fiscal stimulus” spending 
was directed to energy efficiency programmes. It helped that changing street light bulbs, 
insulating public buildings, and increasing use of renewable energy sources constituted 
“shovel ready” investment which could be started widely at relatively short notice. It also 
helped that such investment over the long term could save money as well as the planet.
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5. Territorial Reforms as a Potential Response 
 to the Economic Downturn
5.1. Introduction
Can reforming the territorial structure of local governments be one of the responses 
to the financial crisis in local governments? In several countries in Western and Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe, there are numerous very tiny municipal governments, and 
numerous experts have pointed out the high cost of their functioning. The issue is by 
no means limited to the municipal tier. For example, in Poland the largest potential 
efficiency saving might be found on a county (powiat) level, where 380 units could be 
replaced by a smaller number (expert estimations vary from 150 to 300) of territorially 
larger, cheaper, and more efficient units. The same may apply to the meso or upper tier 
of subnational jurisdictions in other European countries. But for the time being, this 
chapter concentrates on a municipal tier, where the issue seems to be the most urgent 
and brings potential for the highest saving. 
There are plentiful academic literature and expert reports demonstrating the rel-
evance of economy of scale to local administration. Even though economy of scale is 
more visible in capital-intensive rather than labour-intensive sectors (and most of local 
government services belong to labour intensive), there are still examples of the “size ef-
fect” in municipal governments. An excellent review of recent research and theoretical 
arguments has been provided by Houlberg’s chapter in one of the latest books produced 
by the Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative (see Houlberg 2009).21 
Leaving aside other services, on which arguments are more complex, there is no 
doubt that size is negatively correlated with spending on administration. As the 2002 
study showed (Swianiewicz 2002), in several small Slovak, Hungarian, or Czech mu-
nicipalities, administration consumes close to half of the operating budget, leaving not 
much for other functions. Houlberg (2009) demonstrates the economy of scale effect 
in administrative spending in Norway, which strongly affects municipalities with popu-
lations below 5,000. He quotes also Danish studies showing that municipalities can 
save as much as 10% of administrative expenses (or 1.5% of their total budget) if the 
municipalities are amalgamated so that the smallest municipalities have 18,000–25,000 
inhabitants. Finally, he also provides arguments that, at least in Denmark, economies 
21 For extensive reviews of relevant literature, see also Baldersheim and Rose (forthcoming), and for the 
discussion of theoretical arguments on size and effectiveness of local governments, see King (1984), 
Sharpe (1995), Keating (1995).
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of scale have been rising over the last 20 years. In Poland also, small local governments 
spend (per capita) considerably more on administration than larger jurisdictions. For 
example, in 2008 the median spending on administration for rural local government 
below 5,000 citizens was PLN 322, while the median for rural local governments over 
10,000 citizens was PLN 210. A recent careful analysis of one Polish rural government 
that in 1998 split into two separate jurisdictions suggests that as a result of the split new 
municipalities spend every year at least 100,000 more on local administration (leaving 
aside other economic costs that more difficult to measure). 
Of course, there is also an opposite phenomenon, i.e., diseconomies of scale, but 
none of the available studies show these appearing in the production costs of services 
below the population size of (at least) 25–30,000; this does not seem to be an argu-
ment in defence of very small municipalities. A negative impact of larger size may be 
more often found in arguments related to local democracy (as measured, for example, 
by interest in local affairs, electoral turn-out, citizens satisfaction, information about 
local affairs, etc.). But even in that case the negative impact of size is not quite a linear 
function, nor is it the obvious conclusion of all research. For example, Mouritzen (2009, 
forthcoming) on the basis of his studies of Denmark comes to the conclusion that the 
negative impact of size on local democracy is much lower than commonly believed.22 
It all suggests that territorial reforms could be considered an interesting option for 
many countries as a response to economic downturn. But what is a “small size” for a 
municipality? There is no universal answer, only different conclusions from different 
studies of various sectors and countries. But it seems to be agreed that higher costs 
are generated at least by municipalities with less than 5,000 citizens, and that below 
the 1,000 threshold delivery of many functions becomes either next to impossible or 
extremely expensive. 
This simplistic measure is compared with the actual situation in countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe in Figure 7. The data suggest that territorial fragmentation of the 
municipal tier may generate considerable financial costs in all countries except Lithuania, 
Serbia, Georgia, Bulgaria, “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,” and Poland 
(no data for Bosnia and Kosovo23 is presented in the figure). 
22 Although we should note that Mouritzen was comparing “mid-size” governments with larger local 
governments. His analysis did not involve very tiny (below 2–3,000 population) municipalities. 
23 All reference to Kosovo, whether to the territory, institutions or population, in this text should be 
understood in full compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 and without 
prejudice to the status of Kosovo.
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Figure 7. 
Distribution of Municipal Governments According to Their Population Size 
in Central, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe 
 
 Potentially there are several ways to deal with excessive territorial fragmentation 
of local governments:
 • The most obvious is boundary reform through territorial consolidation (amal-
gamation).
 • A frequently suggested alternative is developing voluntary or semivoluntary 
intermunicipal co-operation
 • Less obvious and more indirect solutions may include the contracting out of 
services to private sector companies enjoying economy of scale or one local 
government purchasing services from another. 
The first two solutions are discussed below.
5.2. Territorial Consolidation (Amalgamation) 
Economy of scale arguments were at the heart of several territorial reforms introduced 
after the Second World War, mostly in northern Europe. Reorganisations introduced in 
Norway, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom through-
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out 1950s to 1970s may be provided as examples of this process. To a lesser extent the 
same argument was under consideration in more recent territorial reforms in Denmark, 
Germany, and Greece (see overview in Swianiewicz 2009). 
After 1990 an opposite trend was often witnessed in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Territorial fragmentation was a common tendency present in the Czech Republic, Slova-
kia, Hungary, “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,” and several other countries. 
After 1990 the promotion of decentralization and a paradigm of local autonomy were 
often understood as giving almost every settlement unit the right to become a separate 
local government, even if it was a very tiny village. An attempt to create (or to keep) 
larger territorial jurisdictions was seen as a violation of local autonomy. Very soon ter-
ritorial fragmentation became mentioned as one of the major barriers to decentralization 
and the effective functioning of the local government system. With a different level 
of intensity, such voices could be heard in Albania, “the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia,” Moldova, Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Latvia, Estonia, Ukraine, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and perhaps also in some other countries. In a different 
context similar discussion has been conducted in Poland, where the size of upper tiers of 
subnational government—powiat and województwo—was discussed; likewise in Bulgaria, 
Montenegro, or Poland, bottom-up pressure to split existing larger municipalities has 
occasionally pushed toward the larger degree of territorial fragmentation but countered 
by arguments over cost and scale economy.
Territorial boundary reform is always politically difficult (and often risky for 
the central government) and brings considerable opposition from below. As a result, 
territorial reforms are very often discussed but relatively rarely implemented. In the 
postcommunist environment, one can only point to examples of territorial reforms in 
Georgia, “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,” Latvia, and Lithuania—and 
even in each of these examples there are elements that make them distinct from classic 
amalgamation reforms. 
The crucial question is whether the current financial crisis will provide a stimulus for 
territorial reforms. In theory, central governments should now be especially interested 
in such solutions, and opposition of small local governments experiencing financial 
difficulties should be weaker than in times of prosperity. Expected financial savings 
should sweeten the disadvantages of the reform. However, reports provided by country 
observers suggest this is rarely the case.24
24 My analysis is based on national reports from following countries: Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, and Ukraine as well as reports from a few countries 
of “Old Europe”: France, Finland, Norway. Reports from other countries (Albania, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Montenegro, Russia, Slovenia, “the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia”).
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There are a few countries in which territorial reforms are still discussed (for example, 
Armenia, and Slovakia), but the financial downturn has so far had no impact on this 
process. In some others the lack of discussion simply originates from the current scale 
of territorial consolidation, making the space for potential savings negligible (Bulgaria, 
Serbia). 
There are, however, a few examples of countries in which the current crisis has had 
an impact. In Latvia, the number of municipalities has reduced almost fivefold. Most 
dramatically, Iceland has accelerated a process started in 1990 of cutting the number of 
local authorities from 7,200 to 76. In Estonia the discussion on territorial consolidation 
has been going on for many years, but the crisis put renewed pressure in this direction. 
In March 2009, the plan of consolidation was submitted, but it was soon rejected by 
coalition parties. Also, in Ukraine, territorial reform has been under discussion at least 
since the Orange Revolution (including the radical and never implemented Bessmert-
nyj proposals). In spite of political chaos in Kyiv, the crisis has been used by some 
pro-reformers as an occasion to exert more pressure for change. On 24 April 2009, the 
Ministry of Regional Development and Construction submitted a new draft law on 
territorial reorganisation, stating at the same time that the crisis is a proper and suit-
able time for reform. The draft is not very specific about a new map of the municipal 
tier (similarly to earlier Bessmertnyj proposals, it introduces a new name for the lowest 
level government—hromada—being a unit larger than individual village or a town), 
but states only general principles suggesting that consolidation is inevitable. It is more 
specific about the meso (rayon) level, stating that (with the exception of a very few specific 
situations in the most sparsely populated areas) the rayon should have at least 150,000 
citizens, i.e., be approximately twice as big as the current rayons. It is difficult to say 
how likely its implementation is. The general political turmoil encourages skepticism 
about its chances in the near future. 
Finland has introduced a “financial carrot” for mergers of municipal governments. 
It is expected that at least until 2013 amalgamation will have a voluntary character 
only. The reform has not been directly caused by the financial crisis, but it influenced 
its implementation. In France, the Ministry of Interior submitted in May 2009 a draft 
law which provides for transforming current intermunicipal institutions Etablissements 
Publics de Coopération Communale (EPCI) into so called “new communes.” If the 
law is approved by the Parliament, “new communes” (with a wider set of functional 
responsibilities than the old, small communes) might—on a voluntary principle—re-
place old, very small local governments and allow benefits from economy of scale. The 
influence of the financial crisis on these changes is only indirect (the discussions on the 
reforms of territorial organization in France have been going on “forever”), but it may 
strengthen the process of change. Another country worth mentioning in this section 
is Ireland. Although there are no concrete plans of territorial reforms, a recent report 
commissioned by the Ministry of Finance has recommended the abolition of smaller 
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local authorities and their merger with some larger ones. The aim of the report has been 
to identify possible savings, and territorial consolidation has been mentioned as one of 
possible options worth considering. 
It is a bit surprising that the crisis has not renewed the discussions on territorial 
reforms in Norway, since the issue has been periodically debated in that country for 
many years. 
5.3. Intermunicipal Co-operation (IMC)
Some politicians and experts claim that voluntary intermunicipal co-operation may be 
a useful alternative to territorial amalgamation. Since it avoids the high political costs 
of boundary reforms, and at the same time joint provision of services by a couple or 
more municipalities allows gains from economy of scale, so the financial savings effect 
may be similar. However, as Robert Hertzog suggests, joint provision of services often 
results in improved quality for the same price, rather than in absolute saving, since 
citizens of the municipalities involved demand an increase of the service quality to the 
standard of the best-off partner. More importantly, some authors (including Wollman 
2007, Borraz and Le Gales 2005) express their doubts related to actual outcomes of 
IMC. First, opposite to what advocates of such a solution suggest, bottom-up IMC 
does not happen very often and is not unproblematic. The political difficulty of enter-
ing voluntary co-operation is often similar to that raised by consolidation. It requires 
compromises on the particular interests of the individual municipalities involved. The 
need for agreement on co-operation will sometimes affect the personal ambitions of local 
leaders. But there are also potential organizational and democratic problems related to 
IMC. The joint provision of functions, although frequently bringing financial benefits, 
involves transaction costs, associated with a complicated organizational-managerial 
setting. Complex intercommunal arrangements, including the necessity of debating 
issues by councils of the local municipalities involved, may also slow-down the pace of 
decision-making. The negative side-effect is sometimes that co-operative arrangements 
make accountability toward local citizens and the transparency of the decision-making 
process more problematic. 
Nevertheless, one might expect promotion of intermunicipal co-operation to be-
come a popular political option in times of financial crisis. Such a solutions have been 
successfully promoted for a long time in France and Finland, and in the last few years 
more and more popular (also thanks to the policies of respective central governments) 
in the territorially fragmented systems of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia. 
Even in the UK, collaboration between neighbouring authorities is growing in fields 
such as procurement, IT, development control, and even education management.
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5.4. Conclusions
The reactions of both central and local governments to the crisis have so far been sche-
matic rather than innovative. Looking for savings through cutting some expenditures, 
enlarging budget deficits, or increasing taxes have been called upon much more often 
than policies aimed at increasing spending efficiency and effectiveness. Lack of inter-
est in territorial reforms seems to be an example of such a missed opportunity. This 
situation may be strengthened by the fact that during the difficult economic period, 
central governments are especially afraid of unpopular decisions that might undermine 
their chances to win the next elections. Territorial reforms are rarely popular, especially 
because most people including local politicians are not aware of the potential benefits, 
while immediate political costs are clear to everyone. 
6. Social Policy Connotations of the Economic 
 Downturn
6.1. Changing European Societies
The current world economic downturn has turned the spotlight on the contradictions 
between the economic efficiency and competitiveness of the modern welfare state on 
the one hand, and on social rights on the other. Although the welfare state is one of 
Europe’s most important cultural heritages and has received steadily growing significance 
since the 1990s when shaping EU policy, one key to resolving the economic crisis is 
seen—particularly by the institutions financing the recovery—in cutting public expen-
diture, principally social policy spending. In the newborn welfare states, the former 
state-socialist countries, this type of proposal tends to meet much less resistance than 
in the traditional welfare states. In the latter, the institutions of democracy and strong 
civil societies and interest protection organizations are ready to defend social rights, 
while in the former state-socialist countries these institutions are weak, and political 
discourse is centred on other issues.
The other disadvantage of the former state-socialist countries is that their welfare 
institutions are in a constant state of flux, evolving along the lines of trial and error, and 
there is little reliable statistical data available when attempting to analyze the effects.
A PowerPoint presentation of the World Bank at a conference in spring 2009 con-
tained the following:
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 “Social policy actions are a priority: 
 • The region has started to give back poverty gains of the last decade.
 • Countries with weaker fiscal, financial, and social policies have been hit harder.
 • Most countries in the region have social programs that can be strengthened and 
scaled up to provide targeted assistance.
ECA (Europe and Central Asia) countries were vulnerable, but there are also large 
differences across countries in the region—with seven months of the crisis, the region 
has started to lose poverty gains made over the last 10 years.”25 
Figure 8.
Poverty Rate Projections
Source: World Bank staff estimates.
The downturn has had differing effects on the various social groups and social welfare 
systems designed to support them have responded in different ways.
The general opinion is that the downturn has been felt first of all through the rise 
in unemployment.
25 ECA Economic Briefing. Office of the Chief Economist Europe and Central Asia World Bank Spring 
Meetings 2009.
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Table 6.
Seasonally Adjusted Unemployment Rates26
Geo\time September 2008 September 2009
EU 27 7.7 9.2
Belgium 7.3 7.9
Bulgaria 5.2 7.6
Czech Republic 4.3 7.0
Denmark 3.4 6.4
Germany 7.1 7.6
Estonia 6.5 —
Ireland 6.7 13.0
Greece 7.5 —
Spain 12.4 19.31
France 8.0 10.0
Italy 6.8 —
Cyprus 3.5 5.9
Latvia 8.1 19.7
Lithuania 6.3 —
Luxembourg 5.1 6.6
Hungary 7.8 9.7
Malta 5.8 7.2
Netherlands 2.7 3.6
Austria 3.9 4.8
Poland 6.8 8.2
Portugal 7.8 9.2
Romania 5.8 —
Slovenia 4.1 5.9
Slovakia 8.9 12.0
Finland 6.5 8.6
Sweden 6.4 8.7
United Kingdom 6.0 —
Norway 2.5 —
United States 6.2 9.8
Japan 4.0 —
Source: Eurostat. Last update: 12.08.2009.
26  Antonella Puglia (2009) “Population and Social Conditions.” Statistics in Focus 40/2009.
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While this is true for EU members, in Croatia, for instance, the minimum growth 
appears to have been triggered by seasonal fluctuations linked to the tourist season, at 
least for now.
In the first period of the downturn, the unemployment insurance system has had to 
treat this problem, but later people of active age will need to rely on the social assistance 
system and the poverty relief programmes.
Rarely do we discuss the situation of elderly people although problems concerning 
the maintenance of pension systems have become clear (e.g., Finland, Hungary). True, 
this goes beyond the competence of local governments. Nevertheless, they are faced 
with many tasks related to alleviating poverty among the ageing.
Figure 9.
Social Protection Spending, Regional Averages
Notes:  Data on 69 countries taken from World Bank public expenditure reviews or other similar work. 
For OECD, data from the OECD.
“Safety nets are less suited for crises—ECA spends a lot on social insurance, but less 
on social assistance programs.” This quote comes from the presentation already cited.27 
The wording tends to suggest the need to spend less on social insurance and block 
grants and more on aid, on means-tested programmes. These generalized conclusions 
are ignoring the differing characteristics of the European welfare states.
27 ECA Economic Briefing. Office of the Chief Economist Europe and Central Asia World Bank Spring 
Meetings 2009.
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Table 7.
Expenditure on Social Protection (as Percent of GDP28)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
EU 27 — — — — — 27.1 26.9
EU 25 26.5 26.7 27.0 27.3 27.2 27.3 27.0
EU 15 26.8 27.0 27.3 27.7 27.6 27.7 27.5
EA 15 26.7 26.8 27.4 27.8 27.7 27.8 27.5
Belgium 26.5 27.3 28.0 29.1 29.3 29.7 30.1
Bulgaria — — — — — 16.0 15.0
Czech Republic 19.5 19.4 20.2 20.2 19.3 19.1 18.7
Denmark 28.9 29.2 29.7 30.9 30.7 30.2 29.1
Germany 29.3 29.4 30.1 30.4 29.8 29.7 28.7
Estonia 14.0 13.1 12.7 12.6 13.0 12.7 12.4
Ireland 13.9 14.9 17.5 17.9 18.2 18.2 18.2
Greece 23.5 24.3 24.0 23.6 23.5 24.3 24.2
Spain 20.3 20.0 20.4 20.6 20.7 21.1 20.9
France 29.5 29.6 30.4 30.9 31.3 31.4 31.1
Italy 24.7 24.9 25.3 25.8 26.0 26.3 26.6
Cyprus 14.8 14.9 16.3 18.4 18.1 18.4 18.4
Latvia 15.3 14.3 13.9 13.8 12.9 12.4 12.2
Lithuania 15.8 14.7 14.0 13.5 13.3 13.1 13.2
Luxembourg 19.6 20.9 21.6 22.1 22.2 21.7 20.4
Hungary 19.3 19.3 20.4 21.1 20.8 21.9 22.3
Malta 16.9 17.8 17.8 18.2 18.6 18.4 18.1
Netherlands 26.4 26.5 27.6 28.3 28.3 27.9 29.3
Austria 28.4 28.8 29.2 29.7 29.3 28.8 28.5
Poland 19.7 21.0 21.1 21.0 20.1 19.7 19.2
Portugal 21.7 22.7 23.7 24.1 24.7 25.4 25.4
Romania 13.2 13.2 13.4 12.6 15.1 14.2 14.0
Slovenia 24.2 24.5 24.4 23.7 23.4 23.0 22.8
Slovakia 19.4 19.0 19.1 18.2 17.2 16.7 15.9
Finland 25.1 24.9 25.6 26.5 26.6 26.7 26.2
Sweden 30.1 30.8 31.6 32.5 32.0 31.5 30.7
United Kingdom 26.4 26.8 25.7 25.7 25.9 26.3 26.4
Iceland 19.2 19.4 21.2 23.0 22.7 21.7 21.2
Norway 24.4 25.4 26.0 27.2 25.9 23.8 22.6
Switzerland 26+.9 27.6 28.5 29.1 29.3 29.3 28.4
28 Antonella Puglia (2009) “Population and Social Conditions.” Statistics in Focus 40/2009, p.4.
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Table 8.
Social Protection Receipts by Type (as Percent of Total Receipts)29
General government 
contributions
Social contributions Other receipts
Total Employers Protected Persons (1)
2000 2006 2000 2006 2000 2006 2000 2006 2006 2006
EU 27 — 37.6 — 58.9 — 38.2 — 20.6 — 3.5
EU 25 35.5 37.7 60.9 58.8 38.7 38.2 22.2 20.7 3.6 3.5
EU 15 35.6 38.0 60.9 58.9 38.7 38.3 22.2 20.6 3.5 3.2
EA 15 31.8 34.28 64.3 62.4 41.4 39.8 22.9 22.6 3.9 3.4
Belgium 25.3 27.7 72.1 70.8 49.9 49.3 22.3 21.4 2.5 1.5
Bulgaria — 39.5 — 58.0 — 38.3 — 19.7 — 2.5
Czech Republic 25.0 18.8 73.8 80.3 49.8 53.9 24.0 26.4 1.2 0.9
Denmark 63.9 62.8 29.4 30.8 9.1 11.0 20.3 19.8 6.7 6.4
Germany 31.9 35.3 66.0 63.1 38.4 35.3 27.6 27.8 2.1 1.6
Estonia 20.6 19.5 79.2 80.4 79.2 80.1 — 0.3 0.2 0.1
Ireland 58.6 53.2 41.0 41.8 25.6 26.2 15.4 15.5 0.4 5.0
Greece 29.2 31.4 60.8 57.7 38.2 35.1 22.6 22.6 10.0 10.9
Spain 29.4 33.9 68.0 63.9 51.8 48.5 16.2 15.4 2.6 2.2
France 30.3 30.6 65.9 65.2 46.0 44.3 19.9 20.9 3.8 4.2
Italy 40.6 41.9 57.7 56.4 42.8 41.3 14.9 15.1 1.6 1.6
Cyprus 39.9 48.1 43.0 39.1 26.6 24.0 16.4 15.1 17.1 12.8
Latvia 34.6 35.5 65.4 63.9 49.4 47.1 16.0 16.8 0.0 0.6
Lithuania 38.9 38.5 59.6 61.0 53.7 54.9 5.9 6.1 1.5 0.5
Luxembourg 46.9 45.6 48.6 50.5 24.7 26.5 23.8 24.0 4.6 3.9
Hungary 31.6 40.6 59.7 53.8 47.0 38.6 12.8 15.2 8.7 5.7
Malta 29.8 35.2 67.6 62.0 46.6 43.3 21.0 18.7 2.6 2.8
Netherlands 14.4 20.1 67.5 69.5 29.4 31.8 38.1 37.7 18.1 10.4
Austria 32.3 33.3 66.3 65.3 39.2 37.8 27.1 27.4 1.3 1.4
Poland 32.5 33.3 55.3 48.0 30.5 25.9 24.8 22.0 12.2 18.8
Portugal 39.1 44.1 53.0 45.3 35.6 30.8 17.4 14.5 7.9 10.6
Romania — 19.6 — 69.5 — 56.3 — 13.2 — 10.8
Slovenia 31.5 30.7 66.3 67.9 27.0 27.1 39.3 40.8 2.2 1.4
Slovakia 31.0 25.5 66.8 65.6 48.3 44.2 18.5 21.4 2.2 8.9
Finland 42.9 43.3 50.0 50.6 38.0 38.8 12.0 11.8 7.0 6.0
Sweden 45.9 48.9 49.9 48.7 40.4 39.9 9.4 8.9 4.3 2.4
United Kingdom 46.4 50.4 52.4 47.9 29.9 34.2 22.5 13.7 1.2 1.7
Iceland 51.4 31.6 48.6 30.6 39.5 24.8 9.1 5.8 — 37.9
Norway 60.5 52.9 38.4 47.0 24.4 32.0 14.0 15.0 1.1 0.1
Switzerland 21.0 22.3 60.4 62.2 29.3 28.7 31.1 33.6 18.6 15.4
29 Antonella Puglia (2009) “Population and Social Conditions.” Statistics in Focus 40/2009, p.10.
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Expenditure on social protection as a percentage of GDP was 26.9% in this period 
but differences from one country to the next in the EU 27 are as much as twofold.
While there is only a 0.6% difference between the new members and the EU 15 in 
social protection spending when compared to these countries’ GDPs, there are significant 
differences in the actual amounts used to support people in disadvantaged circumstances.
There are also significant differences from one country to the next in the sources of 
funding for social protection. For the duration of the downturn, the amount of social 
insurance contributions depends primarily on how strong the labour market is and how 
extensive the clandestine economy proves to be. Tax revenues are highly dependent on 
the ability of the public to consume, given the role played by the consumption tax.
Different countries have markedly different systems for financing social protection, 
depending on whether they favour social security contributions or general government 
funding. Government contributions in Denmark, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and 
Norway are particularly high when compared to the social insurance-type inflows. “The 
differences are historical and due to the institutional rationale behind social protec-
tion systems. Northern European countries, where government funding dominates, 
are steeped in the ‘Beveridgian’ tradition (in this type of system, it is sufficient to be a 
resident in need in order to be eligible for social benefits). Other countries are strongly 
attached to the ‘Bismarckian’ tradition, in which the system is based on the insurance 
concept (in the form of contributions). However, the gap/difference between European 
countries is gradually narrowing, with more funding from tax revenue in those countries 
where it used to be low (France, Germany, Italy, and Portugal, for example), on the one 
hand, and with more coming from contributions in the countries with high levels of 
government funding, on the other.”30 
In all countries, the largest single expenditures on social protection are pensions and 
health care, but here, too, there are major differences from country to country. The range 
of pension-type expenditure as a proportion of GDP goes from an average of 11.9% to 
a high of 15.5% (Italy) and a low of 5.5% (Estonia). In health care the average is 7.5%, 
and ranges from a high of 8.7% (France, and Netherlands) and a low of 3.5% (Latvia).
30 Antonella Puglia (2009) “Population and Social Conditions.” Statistics in Focus 40/2009, p.10.
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Figure 10.
Structure of Social Protection Expenditure in EU 27, 200631
Table 9.
Changes in Social Benefits Between 2000 and 2006
Number of beneﬁts affected by the changes Country
1 significant increase Greece, Czech Republic, Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Germany, Slovenia
2 significant increases Estonia, Latvia
3 significant increases Latvia, Spain 
4 significant increases Cyprus, Hungary, Luxembourg 
5 significant increases Ireland, Romania 
1 decrease Belgium, Netherlands, Austria, Malta, Romania, Slovenia, United Kingdom, Estonia, Latvia
2 decreases Poland, Denmark, Sweden
3 or more decreases Germany, Slovakia
While expenditure for social protection grew overall among the European Union 
members between 2000 and 2006 (2.6% in the EU 25, there were differences 
between countries. In Romania (11.0%) and Ireland (10.3%) the growth in welfare 
31 Antonella Puglia (2009) “Population and Social Conditions.” Statistics in Focus 40/2009, p.5.
Social Protection benefits 96.2
Other expenditure 0.7
Administration costs 3.1
Disability 7.2 
Old-age 38.2 
Veterans 5.9
Family/Children 7.7
Unemployment 5.4
Housing 2.2
Social exclusion 1.3
Sickness/Health care 28.1
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expenditure was particularly high. However, a look at the various social benefits yields 
a much more diverse picture. The structure of the benefits and the proportion of the 
changes reflect very different welfare state policies. While Ireland and Romania increased 
their expenditure significantly more than average in all aspects of social benefits, Germany 
and Slovakia introduced significant cuts in all areas except pensions. Some countries 
increased certain benefits while others cut them.
Table 10.
Changes in Social Benefits from 2000 to 2006
Old-age 
and 
veterans
Sickness/
health 
care
Disability Family/children Unemploy-
ment
Housing 
and social 
exclusion
Particularly 
high growth 
Cyprus, 
Estonia, 
Greece, 
Hungary, 
Ireland, 
Romania
Ireland, 
Hungary, 
Latvia, 
Romania
Czech 
Republic,
Cyprus, 
Denmark, 
Estonia, 
Ireland, 
Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, 
Hungary, 
Romania
Cyprus, 
Estonia, 
Ireland, 
Latvia, 
Luxembourg, 
Hungary, 
Netherlands, 
Romania,
Spain
Belgium,
Cyprus, 
Ireland, 
Italy, 
Latvia, 
Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, 
Malta, 
Portugal,
Spain 
Germany, 
Luxembourg, 
Romania, 
Slovenia,
Spain
Reduction Germany, 
Slovakia
Austria, 
Belgium, 
Germany, 
Netherlands, 
Poland
Germany, 
Malta, 
Slovakia
Denmark, 
Germany, 
Poland, 
Romania, 
Slovenia, 
Slovakia, 
Sweden, 
United 
Kingdom
Denmark, 
Estonia, 
Lithuania, 
Slovakia, 
Sweden
Pension expenditure increased everywhere, but two countries reduced health care 
expenditure, four cut benefits for people with disabilities, three brought down benefits 
related to maternity and children, and eight diminished jobless benefits. The largest 
increase in the EU 25 was in funding for assistance, but in contrast with Romania, where 
growth was exceptionally high (35.5%), five countries cut their assistance spending. 
Of itself, the amount of funding for assistance yields little information on the ef-
fectiveness of the aid, and on whether their primary goal—to alleviate poverty—was 
achieved.
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Figure 11.
Persons at Risk of Poverty, 2006 (Percent of Total Population)32
Source: Eurostat (tsisc020 and tsisc030).
Note: (1) Estimates calculated population-size weighted averages of national data. (2) Source: National 
data (HBS 2006). (3) Provisional.
There was a sharp decline in poverty in 2006 in Ireland, Hungary, Finland, Belgium, 
Germany, Austria, France, Sweden, Denmark, Slovenia, Czech Republic, and the Neth-
erlands, while the social assistance provision system was expressly poor in effectiveness 
in Latvia, Greece, Lithuania, Italy, Spain, Romania, Cyprus, and Bulgaria. The graph 
shows that the most effective way of alleviating poverty is not through assistance, for if 
we look at welfare expenditure, there appears to be no connection between the amount 
of funding devoted to assistance and poverty reduction as an outcome. (There are coun-
tries devoting both more and less than average to this end among the ones with effective 
poverty reduction programmes as well as among the ones where outcomes are poor.)
We have to conclude that given the vast differences in systems, uniform solutions 
appear impossible, while at the same time it is particularly important to increase the 
efficiency of protection systems given the pressures of the economic downturn.
32  Key Figures on Europe. 2009 edition. Eurostat Pocketbook, p.90.
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6.2. Social Assistance Systems and Responses to the Crisis
The European social assistance systems differ widely, not only in whom they target but 
also in their poverty-alleviating effects and the size of budget funds they employ. One 
very significant difference from the point of view of our subject relates to whether they 
have any general basic form of assistance dependent only on the size of family incomes 
(e.g., Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia). Another significant difference is whether the institu-
tional system operates with central government funding and the aid is provided by a 
deconcentrated body (as Bulgaria, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Armenia do) or 
it is decentralised. In the latter case, alternatives range from local governments simply 
distributing the central funds, through operating in a decentralized system with resources 
coming from the central government but with local governments making the decisions 
(e.g., in Hungary, the Czech Republic, Italy, Iceland) to local governments not only mak-
ing the decisions but also providing the lion’s share of the funds (Sweden, and Slovakia). 
These differences are significant regarding responses to the downturn, for they 
determine the actors that have to deal with the distress.
When considering ways to improve targeting, we often believe that community 
resources should be limited to people in real need, and often the large systems financed 
through taxes and contributions (social security, health care, maternity, and family 
benefits) provide support to people who would otherwise be able to mobilize their 
own resources.
Figure 12. 
Means-tested Social Benefits, 2006 (as Percent of Total Social Benefits)33
Source: Eurostat.
Note: The percentages in this figure are calculated out of data expressed in euro.
33 Antonella Puglia (2009) “Population and Social Conditions.” Statistics in Focus 40/2009, p.9.
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Many people see the way to overcome negative effects in expanding the circle of 
means-tested benefits. In all EU member states, people in need of assistance can access 
the vast majority of welfare benefits without means testing. In some countries means 
testing—including income and assets—is a requirement not only in determining aid 
to alleviate poverty, but also in granting other types of entitlements. For instance, in 
Serbia entitlement to family allowances is means tested.
Poor targeting cannot be reduced to the problem of leaky funds. In the countries 
where many people are poor, the other side of the targeting—that not all people who 
need it can receive social assistance—is a huge problem. 
Many features of the social protection systems can lead to good or poor outcomes. 
“Where social assistance programs are not fully funded, as is the case for the vast majority 
of programs, errors of exclusion will occur because of the caps put on enrollment to keep 
programs within budget allocations.”34 Lack of information and high transaction costs 
(such as the stigma attached to applying for assistance) lead many people who would be 
entitled to assistance to fail to apply for it. “In a study of Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia cash transfers, child allowances, and social pensions (…), the mean coverage rate 
of the first quintile is 42 percent. A study reviewing experience in a small number of 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries was 
able to model take-up more closely among eligible individuals, and concluded that 
take-up rates typically are between 40 and 80 per cent for social assistance and housing 
programs.”35 
Relying on available international statistics and responses of national specialists to 
a questionnaire, we can conclude that in most countries local governments have not 
seen any substantive moves being taken to alleviate the social outcomes of the down-
turn. This is true even though, for instance, the Committee of the Regions36 wrote: 
“the financial crisis and its negative impact on economic growth and employment will 
increase demand for assistance, social aid, public services preferential tariffs, and local 
and regional authorities are in the front line regarding these expectations....”
The initial phase of the crisis was apparent primarily in a vast increase in the number 
of people applying for unemployment benefits. Only after these benefits expire will the 
effects be measurable on the level of the aid system and the local governments.
34 Margaret Grosh, Carlo del Ninno, Emil Tesliuc, and Azedine Ouerghi (2008) For Protection and 
Promotion: The Design and Implementation of Eﬀective Safety Nets. The World Bank, p.90.
35 Conditional cash transfers reducing present and future poverty. Ariel Fiszbein and Norbert Schady 
with Francisco H.G. Ferreira, Margaret Grosh, Nial Kelleher, Pedro Olinto, and Emmanuel Skoufias 
(2009) The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The World Bank, p.73.
36 Resolution of the Committee of the Regions on the financial crisis (2009/C 76/13).The committee 
of the regions. The Official Journal of the European Union of 31.03.2009. 23. http://eur-lex.europa.
eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2009:076:0063:0065:EN:PDF.
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The crisis can have two different effects on public welfare expenditure. On the one 
hand, reductions are recommended to manage public finance shortfalls, while on the 
other, increases are needed since the number of people who need assistance is bound 
to rise. 
As far as the amount of social spending is concerned, there have been no significant 
changes in any country.
Table 11.
Changes in Social Protection Expenditure
Social protection expenditure
No downturn linked changes 
in general
Changes were introduced, 
but indications are only of 
cost-cutting and more careful 
spending 
Changes were introduced—
mainly proactive (including 
possible budget tightening)
Armenia, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, France, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia,  
“the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia”
Bulgaria, Hungary, Russia Finland, Hungary, Ireland, 
Russia, UK
In Russia, for instance, the federal government in its April 2009 resolution provided 
for an additional 34 billion rubles to be allocated to Russian Federation subjects as 
unemployment support while at the same time decisions were taken to cut the budgets 
of several cities and local government bodies have been asked to develop antirecession-
ary measures.
Ireland is clearly attempting to expand its resources. It seeks to alleviate the effects 
of the downturn principally by reshaping the jobless benefit system. “Nationally, the 
cost of social benefits has risen sharply—the budget for 2009 is already 20% more than 
what was spent in 2008. Total gross spending on social welfare is expected to account 
for 29% of gross total government expenditure in 2009” (National expert).
In Slovakia: “The Parliament enacted the new law on social services in October 2008 
which forces local governments to increase social expenditures. This trend set up by the 
government is not sustainable so they changed some terms of entering some parts of law 
into force (they postponed some terms to 2013). We do not consider this approach as 
responsible even though the government’s social expenditures were comparably lower 
than those of local governments. Postponing of the term of entering a law into force is 
not a systematic approach” (National expert).
At the same time, we rarely see a case in the countries under investigation when a 
general cut in social expenditure or a reduction in a specific form of welfare expenditure 
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becomes a tool to achieve macroeconomic equilibrium. Hungary, however, cut its central 
budget expenditure on social services by 6%.
In some countries, local governments, particularly in cases when social service 
funding comes from the central budget, have tried to pressure central governments to 
increase resources. In Poland, for instance, “representatives of Polish cities asked the 
central government to prepare an anti-crisis package for local governments,” but failed 
to receive it.
Table 12.
Changes in Financing of Social Assistance and Social Services
Change in social assistance only
—increased (spending)
Croatia, Finland, France, Poland, Romania, 
Russia, Slovakia
In services only, new/expanded Estonia
In both—increase —
Negative reaction: fewer resources for aid —
Negative reaction: fewer resources for services Armenia, Hungary
No change Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Luxembourg
Some countries (Estonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Ukraine) responded to 
the downturn by slowing down or postponing scheduled reforms in their social systems. 
During a crisis, the ratio of poor people who can access the support, in other words, 
the take-up rate, is very important. 
Table 13.
The Method of Allocation and Prioritising the Needs of the Poorest Households
Priorities-targeting Obstacles to poor households receiving social assistance
Priority (stronger) 
to poorest households
—due to the crisis 
No (no need, works
satisfactorily)
No, bad targeting Yes, mentions reasons
Estonia, Ireland Finland, France, 
Luxembourg, Poland
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 
Romania, Serbia, 
Ukraine
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Estonia, Finland, 
Romania, Russia, Serbia, 
Ukraine
Traditional welfare states have responded to the social challenges of the downturn by 
operating existing systems of institutions. As the Finnish expert noted when responding 
to our questionnaire: “The legislation of the social sector is working properly and there 
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is no need to update it in this phase. There have been lately several updates to indexes to 
make allocations better, usually by 3–5% rise.” As the expert from Luxembourg wrote: 
“Well-targeted, no need for special measures.”
However, there have been no changes in the assistance system even where there 
are serious problems in targeting, such as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Romania, and 
Ukraine. In Russia, the main problem according to the national expert is not that the 
assistance does not reach the poor, but that the resources evaporate. 
When asked to mention a reason why it is hard to get the aid to the poor, the Es-
tonian expert saw the most important problem in entitlement conditions. (The local 
government may refuse the assistance, if the applicant refuses work offered). In Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, administering the application causes problems in remote areas. The 
Finnish expert referred to the usual waiting time, while the Russian expert noted the 
long queues for documents when applying for cost-of-living support.
Regarding social services, there are even fewer noticeable positive or negative 
changes. Estonia is the only country where we know of proactive tools, where there are 
more social work places and meals on wheels. Hungary was the only country to cut 
expenditure (minus 6%), while in Armenia, the national expert cited the consequences 
of the devaluation of the national currency. 
The NGOs can play roles in distributing services either from their own resources or 
as the contracted partners of the local self-governments. There is no indication in the 
country reports that central or local governments willingly choose this method of crisis 
management which involves shifting responsibility. The French expert is quite explicit: 
“Numerous associations in France aim to fight poverty by legal means. A number of 
them benefit from subsidies and request public funding but they have never been used 
by government or by local authorities to reduce the costs of social services.”
In several countries that have transformed their social welfare systems in recent years, 
the development of NGOs and their provision of services are still in their infancy (for 
instance: Bosnia and Herzegovina and Ukraine).
“Ukraine’s government continued to develop reforms in social service provision 
(to strengthen the role of community services) at the routine speed, without specific 
response to crisis-related pressures” (National expert).
 In Slovakia, the NGOs have taken unique action—they are calling for EU funding 
to cover the build-up and more powerful role of the sector.
6.3. Workfare and/or Welfare?
A key to the sustainability of the European welfare states as well as to boosting their 
competitiveness and bolstering their social cohesion is increasing the number of people 
with jobs as well as the proportion of the working population. Unquestionably, the most 
effective way to alleviate poverty is for people to have work.
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There are three buzzwords in use to describe employment promotion, albeit with 
slightly different content. They are “activation policies,” “workfare,” and “welfare-to-
work.” 
“Activation” as a socio-political labour market strategy is an umbrella concept. “The 
term is broad and refers to a wide range of policies that, i.e., are targeted at people receiv-
ing public benefits, and/or in danger of being excluded from the labour market (…). 
Goals and measures may differ; the goals may be (re)entrance into the labour market, 
the development of work related skills, etc., while the measures may vary from voluntary 
training to obligatory work programmes. Other instruments may be job creation, wage 
subsidies and financial incentives.”37 
The essence of this concept is to replace passive labour market tools (such as various 
cash supports) with measures to improve job skills.
The workfare38 (“work-for-your-welfare”) model rests on the assumption that when 
people of active age receive aid, the outcome is welfare dependency. The belief is that 
they no longer want to work because they receive the aid without doing anything. 
This approach, which originated in the United States, sets conditions (such as training 
courses, rehabilitation, mandatory community service or taking a communal job) as 
the prerequisite to receiving a minimum subsistence level of social support. Since the 
belief is that the biggest obstacle to work for this group is the attitudes of the jobless 
themselves, workfare advocates use the social assistance system to put pressure on the 
people outside the workforce to accept any job opportunity. This attitude differs from 
the traditional tenet of the welfare state in that it does not consider provision of mini-
mum subsistence conditions as basic right of all citizens.
The welfare-to-work concept was introduced to Europe by the UK, where it was part 
of Tony Blair’s “New Deal” programme. While it offers a wide range of human capital 
development tools to unemployed people of various ages to promote success on the job 
market, it is similar to workfare in that refusal to participate can result in a loss of benefits.
All three concepts employ both the carrot and the stick, but to different extents and 
with differing consequences. 
The activation approach relies primarily on labour market and employment policy 
means, while workfare and welfare-to-work connect labour market and income main-
tenance tools.
“Another feature of European welfare policies is the general trend of the reforms; 
towards active measures rather than passive, sanctions rather than incentives, duties 
rather than rights. Further trends include the approval of a public contract approach 
37 Nanna Kildal (2001) Workfare Tendencies in Scandinavian Welfare Policies. Geneva: International 
Labour Office, February 2001, p.2. http://www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/ses/download/docs/
workfare.pdf.
38 US terminology uses the word “welfare” as a synonym for social assistance.
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rather than a rights-based approach and an emphasis on selectivity rather than univer-
sality. (…) Thus, there seems to be a kind of convergence both in the interpretation of 
political challenges and in the political answers, irrespective of national institutional 
preconditions. This tendency towards convergence in national welfare policies is, it is 
true, mixed with divergent trends in other respects.”39 
We did not have the capacity to conduct extensive research for this study, in that 
we were unable to study the legislative environments and systems of institutions of each 
country. Therefore, we were forced to rely on the MISSOC database and the isolated 
comments included in responses of experts to the questionnaire. Our overview of the 
occurrence of the various ways of managing social assistance is therefore incomplete.
Table 14.
Orientation of the Activation Measures Directed to People on Social Assistance
Focus is more on heightening capabilities Focus is more on employment policy
Czech Republic, France, Georgia, Iceland, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, Slovenia
Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Slovakia
As already mentioned, the activation measures can include training and retraining, 
provision of work experience, or participation is one form or another of community or 
public work, as well as the capability development solutions that rely on social work tools. 
The difference—among others—lies in the nature of the organizations responsible for 
the activation. Are they exclusively or primarily employment services or does some social 
institution also play a substantive role? Another factor behind differing work methods 
and interests is that employment services are for the most part large and centralized 
institutions operating within hierarchies and maintaining uniform orders of procedure, 
while social services are generally within the purview of local governments that attempt 
to ascertain the specifics of individuals and work with them in mind. Their clients are 
families, not just working-age social assistance recipients.
One form of aid that has been introduced in a growing number of countries is 
the conditional cash transfer (CCT). The “condition” is not necessarily work-related. 
In some developing countries for instance, it is connected to major social policy goals 
such as sending children to school or the fulfilment of health care requirements. “Many 
social policy analysts also see a parallel in the move to CCTs in developing countries and 
the welfare-to-work agenda in the United States and Europe, as embodied by reforms 
that led to the Revenu Minimum d’Insertion in France, the Temporary Assistance for 
39 Nanna Kildal (2001) Workfare Tendencies in Scandinavian Welfare Policies. Geneva: International 
Labour Office, February 2001, p.2. http://www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/ses/download/docs/
workfare.pdf, p.1.
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Needy Families (TANF) reforms in the United States, and the New Deal in the United 
Kingdom. Like CCTs in the developing world, all of these programs require ‘desired 
behaviour’ in exchange for income support. In settings with highly informal labour 
markets, the conditions on children’s health and schooling are easier to monitor than 
job search and work requirements and thus are sensible adaptations of the basic notion 
of linking social assistance to positive behavioural change.”40 
Methods like this, which limit personal and family autonomy, are nontraditional 
in the European welfare states, but they do crop up from time to time. In Hungary, 
for instance, although statistics show that irregular school attendance is negligible, and 
although there are institutional ways of achieving adherence to the statutory obligation 
of attending school, some local governments would like to link assistance to the verified 
school attendance of children. Another example is Latvia, where there is a requirement 
for “Acceptance of medical treatment and rehabilitation (for example, in the case of 
alcohol or drug abuse) and participation in measures promoting employment (for ex-
ample, retraining, paid temporary jobs, etc.).”41
Table 15. 
Activation and the Safety Net
Stick Carrot
Aid may be halted completely 
if recipient does not accept
activation measures
Aid may be reduced if recipient 
does not accept activation 
measures
Aid is withdrawn in gradual 
increments if recipient gets 
a job
Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary Denmark, Sweden Cyprus, France, Georgia, 
Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, 
Malta, UK
Many analysts see the main reason why living on assistance is a counter-incentive to 
taking a job is the poverty trap, that is, that the income coming from work is not appre-
ciably larger than the amount received as aid, while taking a job increases expenditure. 
The problem can be resolved by gradually reducing but not eliminating the benefit, when 
cutting it off completely might jeopardize subsistence or by gradually tapering off the 
benefit once a person begins to work. There are several examples of the latter in Europe. 
40 Ariel Fiszbein and Norbert Schady, with H.G. Francisco Ferreira, Margaret Grosh, Nial Kelleher, 
Pedro Olinto and Emmanuel Skoufias (2009) Conditional Cash Transfers, Reducing Present and Future 
Poverty, The World Bank, p.33.
41 MISSOC database. Mutual Information System on Social Protection http://ec.europa.eu/employ-
ment_social/spsi/missoc_en.htm.
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Workfare, which pulls the social safety net out from under recipients, which pun-
ishes people who do not or cannot participate in activation programmes along with 
their families who are not responsible for rejecting the activation programmes, clearly 
casts doubts on whether social rights exist at all. Denial of the aid punishes not only the 
person from whom it is withdrawn, but, for example, all children living in the family 
as well. The intensity with which this type of sanction is applied varies. In some places 
the amount of assistance is reduced, while elsewhere it is completely cut off for longer 
or shorter periods of time.
In the United States, when workfare was introduced, the majority of welfare recipi-
ents were African-Americans. In Europe today, Roma (in Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, 
and Serbia) and immigrants from ethnic minority groups are overrepresented among the 
targets of activation measures. This strongly suggests that efforts to introduce workfare 
are racist in motivation. Even if they are not, when evaluating the method, we cannot 
ignore the extent to which they affect different ethnic groups. 
The reasons some people are unable to break into the labour market are more than 
personal ones that could be remedied through employment policy and social means. The 
operation of the labour market itself and its workforce needs also play roles. Activation 
measures are different when they include job opportunities even for people with low 
education levels and no skills, when flexitime is widespread, and when there is a social 
economy as against where and when there simply is no place to reintegrate the jobless. 
In times of downturn, with narrowed-down labour markets and growing unemploy-
ment, the question becomes particularly acute: can a phenomenon that is economic and 
structural in nature be blamed on the individual? Studies by experts in the countries 
under scrutiny simply suggest that there has been a rise in the number of aid recipients, 
that spending on assistance has increased, but fail to mention whether any system-wide 
changes had been introduced, even temporarily.
6.4. Lessons
To date, most countries have not attempted to alleviate the budget ills caused by the 
downturn by cutting social expenditure.
Information received to date suggests that no country has introduced system-wide 
measures to alleviate the social effects of the crisis. Nor have we found any example 
of a country taking advantage of the crisis-induced situation to implement hitherto 
postponed structural reforms. Instead, we tended to see the suspension of planned or 
barely begun reforms in welfare systems. 
Obviously, the drop in employment exacerbates problems with financing social 
security-based pension systems. In countries where there has been a sizable rise in 
unemployment, it is still a bit early for the aid systems to feel the hit they have taken.
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In strongly centralized social assistance systems, government measures alone de-
termine the amount of funding available and the circle of possible beneficiaries. Big 
government bureaucracies are slower to move and less able to introduce differentiated 
solutions than decentralized systems in which local communities can calculate the 
situations of individual groups in shaping their systems and regrouping their resources. 
However, the decentralized systems also can find themselves in trouble, for it is easy to 
blame the local government if central financing does not keep up with the change in 
the number of applicants. In countries where local decision-makers enjoy a high level 
of discretion in awarding the assistance, growing public dissatisfaction can be dissipated 
by excluding ethnic minorities, which in turn can lead to ethnic conflict.
Setting conditions on receiving benefits, particularly if the conditions are aimed at 
testing willingness to work, that is, deservingness, is very risky when it is obvious that 
under the conditions of the economic downturn there is no chance of any long-term 
reintegration into the workforce.
The pilot study on which this analysis rests is quite adamant in pointing out that 
often the statistical data collection systems used to ascertain the social circumstances and 
welfare supply systems of the public are inaccurate and slow. Thus, they are incapable 
of providing sufficient reliable information on which to make well-founded decisions.
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Annex I 
Bulgarian Experiences in Promoting 
Municipal Efﬁciency
Introduction
In the last 10 years, Bulgaria has gained some experience in the assessment of municipal 
services from the point of view of efficiency. Several pilot projects funded by the USAID 
and the Open Society Institute–Sofia were carried out, which drew some experience from 
the international academic research but the concrete task was practically oriented—to 
provoke a policy debate on municipal efficiency by demonstrating that municipalities 
face a wide variety of unit costs. 
The projects found out that there were wide variations in unit costs for different 
services across municipalities in Bulgaria. For each variety in the unit costs, there may 
be some reasonable explanation, but what is sure is that it needs to be explained. In the 
Bulgarian case the idea was not to use a very complicated methodology, to keep the 
conclusions simple and suitable for a policy debate. 
Two attempts for comparative assessment of efficiency carried out by the Open 
Society Institute–Sofia built upon previous work funded by USAID. USAID supported 
the elaboration of a special Manual for Evaluation of Local Service Performance (Markov 
and Tafradjiiski 2007). The pilot project collected empirical data to check the methodol-
ogy described in the manual. For this purpose four typical local services were selected: 
Street Cleaning, Solid Waste Collection and Transportation, Landscaping and Street 
Lighting. The Manual was developed by Angel Markov from the Local Government 
and Public Service Reform Initiative and Borislav Tafradjiiski from Club Ekonomika 
2000. The project was carried out in six Bulgarian municipalities: Kardjali, Razgrad, 
Sliven, Mezdra, Karlovo, and Dobrich. 
The manual uses the concept of service performance, which is very close to the usual 
concept of municipal efficiency but is based more on the target of achieving certain 
benchmarks defined as standards for the provision of the corresponding service. 
When overseeing the service improvement strategies, the manual uses the concepts of 
efficiency and effectiveness, trying to integrate them into a single framework of analysis.
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The following questions were asked to outline the understanding of the two basic 
concepts: 
 • Effectiveness—is the quality of the existing service measurable and good?
 • Efficiency—are the available resources used in the best possible way? 
The manual develops also some basic tools for full costs accounting and programme-
based budgeting for local authorities.
Some Pilot Municipal Efﬁciency Experiences from Bulgaria 
The next important step in developing the methodology for assessment of municipal ef-
ficiency was a pilot survey carried out in fifteen Bulgarian municipalities. It was organized 
by the Resource Centre for Decentralization and Municipal Development42 to determine 
and compare the unit costs for four local municipal services: garbage collection, street 
cleaning, planting, and street lightening and two delegated services. The main factors 
analyzed are the scope and quality of the services. The main target of the project is to 
make the services in the different municipalities comparable, set benchmarks based on 
the best cost-benefit ratio, and initiate a discussion on how these benchmarks can be met. 
The monitoring of municipal services based on predetermined efficiency and effec-
tiveness factors allows the tracking of different processes taking place at the municipal 
level, especially those related to their financial situation and the management of the 
services. These indicators allow a better understanding of the challenges that the mu-
nicipalities may face in the provision of services. 
Participation in the monitoring was on a voluntary basis, which guarantees the 
reliability of the information provided. Fifteen Bulgarian municipalities participated in 
the project: Pleven, the town of Dobrich, Kardjali, Pazardjik, Troyan, Mezdra, Tervel, 
Zlatograd, Stara Zagora, Gabrovo, Kozloduy, Belene, Kneja, Koprivshtitsa, and Try-
avna. The survey included four local option services (financed by the municipalities 
own revenues)—garbage collection and transportation, street cleaning, landscaping and 
street lighting—and two delegated services (services mandated by the central govern-
ment)—mainstream schools and kindergarten. The survey uses data for 2006 and 2007.
The services were assessed against preliminarily defined indicators of efficiency and 
effectiveness, which allowed tracking different processes taking place at the municipal 
42 The Resource Centre for Decentralization and Municipal Development is an organization comprising 
the Open Society Institute–Sofia and Partners for Effective Solutions Ltd.
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level related to the financing and management of services. These indicators highlight the 
main challenges faced by municipalities in the provision of the corresponding service.
Collecting comparative information on the provision of services across municipalities 
is an important step toward their better understanding. This also is a way to improve 
quality and coverage and make expenditure more transparent. Such comparisons also 
allow municipalities to set strategic priorities through benchmarking.
The main indicators for each service were listed and defined and a data collection 
form with a manual of explanatory notes was made. The main focus of the project was 
on the presentation of the data and the dissemination of good practice.
Below we give the list of the main indicators used for each service:
Street Lighting 
Indicators of Eﬀectiveness
Figure 13.
Operational Costs/Total Number of Lights
This indicator shows how much an illuminant costs to the local government. This 
is a typical unit costs indicator, which shows how cost efficient is the provision of street 
lighting in general.
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Figure 14.
Energy Costs/Total Number of Working Lights
This indicator shows how much the municipality pays for electricity per illuminant. It 
is a unit cost indicator, which shows specifically how energy efficient is the street lighting.
Figure 15.
Energy Saving Lamps as a Percent of the Total Number of Lamps
This indicator shows to what extent the local authority provides the service in a 
more technologically advanced way and to what extent it has invested in technological 
improvement.
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Figure 16.
Street Lighting Costs per 1,000 Inhabitants
This is a unit cost indicator, which shows how efficient the local government is 
in providing the service to each inhabitant. But the indicator does not tell about the 
quality of the service.
Eﬃciency and Quality Indicators
Figure 17.
Number of Complaints/1,000 Inhabitants
This is a typical consumer satisfaction indicator, which should demonstrate how 
dissatisfaction of the population drops.
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Figure 18.
Illuminated Street Network as a Percent of the Whole Network
This indicator measures the quality of the service. More illuminated streets mean 
better quality but higher costs. So it is important to use this and the next indicator in 
conjunction with the unit cost indicators to guarantee that what appears to be efficiency 
does not come in the shape of very poor quality of the service.
Figure 19.
Number of Lights/1,000 Inhabitants
This indicator like the previous one measures the quality of the service. It has to be 
used together with the unit cost indicators. It can be used with almost any local service.
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Figure 20.
Number of Lights/Total Surface of the Populated Area
This is an indicator of technical efficiency, which shows how efficiently the lighting 
of a territory is organized. But it does not tell if this is a result of good design or just 
of poor quality of the service—too few street lamps. So this indicator has to be used 
together with some quality indicators like beneficiary satisfaction.
Garbage Collection
Indicators of Eﬀectiveness
Figure 21.
Operational Costs/Collect Waste (Tons)
This is typical unit cost indicator, which indicates the overall cost efficiency of garbage 
collection so it should be used in conjunction with the previous indicator.
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Figure 22.
Operational Costs/Total Volume (m3) of the Waste Collection Container
This is again a unit cost indicator, which indicates the cost efficiency in the man-
agement of available assets. But it does not tell if these assets are too big or too small. 
Eﬃciency and Quality Indicators
Figure 23. 
Attended Population/Total Population
This is an output indicator which shows the scope and coverage of the service and 
its accessibility.
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Figure 24. 
Household Waste Fee Revenue/Cleaning Activities Expenditures
This indicator shows if the service is financially sustainable. If revenue is much lower 
that the expenditures this may be due to a high rate of subsidizing the service or to very 
low cost efficiency. This indicator can be misleading if used as a stand alone but quite 
revealing in a package with other indicators.
Figure 25.
Recycled Water (Tons)/Total Collected Waste
This is an indicator of the quality of the service in terms of reducing the ecological 
damage and other positive externalities. 
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Figure 26.
Household Waste Fee Revenue per Inhabitant
This indicator shows how “expensive” the service is to the inhabitants. It is a unit 
price indicator (or a proxy for a unit cost indicator), which has to be used together with 
quality indicators.
Figure 27.
Household Waste Fee Revenue from Physical Persons per Inhabitant
This is the same indicator as the previous one but excluding legal entities (busi-
nesses, etc.).
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
2005 2006 2007
DOBRICH
KARDJALI
MEZDRA
PAZARDJIK
PLEVEN
TROYAN
ZLATOGRAD
MUNICIPALITY 
KNEJA
GABROVO
Average
0
5
10
15
20
25
2005 2006 2007
DOBRICH
KARDJALI
MEZDRA
PAZARDJIK
PLEVEN
TROYAN
ZLATOGRAD
MUNICIPALITY 
KNEJA
GABROVO
Average
109
A N N E X  I :  B U L G A R I A N  E X P E R I E N C E S  I N  P R O M O T I N G  M U N I C I PA L  E F F I C I E N C Y
Street Cleaning
Indicators of Eﬀectiveness
Figure 28. 
Operational Costs/Cleaned Areas
A typical unit cost indicator using natural units. It shows the overall cost efficiency 
of the service production.
Eﬃciency and Quality Indicators
Figure 29. 
Kilometres of Cleaned Street/Total Kilometres of Street
This indicator shows the quality of the service. More cleaned streets mean a larger 
scope of service and can be even regarded as a better quality if we take the cleaning of 
the city to be an integral task. So it is important to use this indicator in conjunction 
with the unit cost indicators to guarantee that what appears to be efficiency does not 
come in the shape of very poor service quality.
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Figure 30.
Decares Cleaned Streets per Year/Total Number of Working Days
This is indicator of technical efficiency, which shows how technologically advanced 
the production of the service is. It may also show, other things equal, how well the service 
is managed and whether there is redundant staff.
Kindergarten
Expenditures
Figure 31.
Per Child Costs in Kindergarten
Maintenance costs of the kindergarten per child
 • Share of the maintenance costs of the kindergarten in the total current costs
 • Share of the labour costs of the kindergarten per child
 • Share of the labour costs of the kindergarten in the total current costs
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 • Costs for additional provision of pedagogical services per child in the kinder-
garten
 • Share of the costs for additional provision of pedagogical services in the kin-
dergarten in the total current costs
 • Capital costs in the kindergarten per child
 • Share of the capital costs in the kindergarten in the total costs
These are i ndicators of the overall service provision and of specific aspects of cost 
efficiency. These indicators should be used together with quality assessment indicators 
and interpreted with care. For example, a high share of the labour costs and low share 
of maintenance and capital costs may indicate that there are too many teachers per child 
or that the service is underfunded.
Indicators of Eﬀectiveness
Figure 32.
Number of Children per Employee in Kindergarten
This is an indicator of technical efficiency. Like all similar indicators it should be used 
together with quality assessment indicators to guarantee this high technical efficiency 
does not come at the expense of overcrowded classes and poor teaching. In the above 
case not just the pedagogical but the whole staff is considered.
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Figure 33.
Current Costs per Child in  Kindergarten
A typical unit cost indicator focusing on operational costs. Low operational costs per 
child again may be a sign of good management but can also be a result of underfunding 
if they come at the expense of an essential deterioration of the quality of the service.
Eﬃciency and Quality Indicators
Figure 34.
Share of Kindergarten-age Children Who Attend Kindergarten 
in the Total Number of Kindergarten-age Children
Enrollment rates are a key indicator of the quality of educational services, as well as of 
access and equity. So they should always be used together with cost efficiency indicators.  
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Schools
Expenditures
Figure 35.
Total General Secondary School Expenses per Student
This is the classical cost efficiency indicator in education.
 • Share of the labour expenses of the general secondary schools per student
 • Share of the labour expenses of the general secondary schools in the total current 
expenses
 • Share of the expenses for additional pedagogical services (including free choice 
subject) in the general secondary schools in the total current expenses
 • Capital expenses of the general secondary schools per student
 • Share of the capital expenses of the general secondary schools in the total ex-
penses
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Figure 36.
Capital Expenses per Student
As in the case with kindergartens, these indicators should be used together with 
quality assessment indicators and interpreted with care. For example, a high share of 
the labour costs and low share of maintenance and capital costs may indicate that there 
are too many teachers per child or that the service is underfunded.
Indicators of Eﬀectiveness
Figure 37.
Number of Students per Employee in the General Secondary Schools
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This is an indicator of technical efficiency. Many indicators of technical efficiency 
show if a certain service is produced with more or less physical inputs measured in 
natural units. Usually technical efficiency translates into cost efficiency, although there 
are exceptions. The teacher/student ratio is one of the most closely monitored indica-
tors in education. In this case again, efficiency gains have to be weighed against quality 
benefits. A low teacher/student ratio may sometimes be a sign of too low workload for 
the teachers but it may also be a chance for more individual work with the students 
and better student outcomes. 
Eﬃciency and Quality Indicators
Figure 38.
Share of the School-age Children Enrolled in Schools 
in the Total Number of School-age Children
Enrollment rates for school-age children are one of the major indicators of how the 
education system performs. No cost efficiency indicator should be used without check-
ing it against the potential impact on enrollment rates. For example, the recent abrupt 
introduction of per student funding at very low rates lead to the closure of more than 
300 (more than 12% of all) schools in Bulgaria in a single year. But this cost efficiency 
dividend came at too high social cost, abruptly decreasing enrollment rates. 
The results from the survey were discussed at a roundtable with the participating 
municipalities to have their feedback on the interpretation of results. Then the final 
document was presented to the administration of each municipality by highlighting the 
main relevant findings, especially the areas where, according to comparative benchmark-
ing in the corresponding municipality, there is room for improvement. 
Another example of an analysis of municipal efficiency from Bulgaria focuses on 
the revenues and expenditures of the large cities, which function as territorial govern-
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ments. Five-year time series (2003–2007) of main revenue and expenditure budgetary 
items were collected and analyzed for four large cities—the capital Sofia, Plovdiv, Varna, 
and Bourgas. Plovdiv is the second biggest city in Bulgaria after the capital located in 
the south-central part of Bulgaria. Varna and Bourgas are the third and fourth biggest 
cities in Bulgaria both located on the Black Sea cost. The analysis demonstrated that 
the revenues of these largest municipalities grew at the same pace as the rest of the 
municipalities in Bulgaria with the exception of the municipality of Varna, but it was 
due mainly to an increase in their own revenues with constant or decreasing subsidies 
from the central government. 
Figure 39.
Consolidated Budget Revenues of the Municipality of Sofia 2003–2008
Figure 40. 
Consolidated Budget Revenues 2003–2007 
(Four Cities and Average for Bulgaria)
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The biggest decrease was in the transfers for capital investment. 
On the expenditure side again the four biggest cities were no different from the aver-
age municipality in Bulgaria in terms of per capita expenditures and expenditure growth.
Figure 41.
Consolidated Budget Expenditures 2003–2007 
(Four Cities and Average for Bulgaria)
Policy Alternatives
The difference between what was done before the crisis and what will likely be the pri-
orities now in terms of municipal efficiency can be illustrated by the following matrix 
of policy options. To keep things simple, the matrix is two-dimensional, containing 
only generalised input and output. Both the input and the output side can, of course, 
be broken into lower order items.
Input Output
Compromise Same Increased
Reduced X (1) X (2) O/X (3)
Preservation Business as usual O
Increased O
Notes: O—before the crisis, X—during the crisis.
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Inputs in this case refer to all resources, which are used to produce an output. This 
includes all operational costs and investments. Outputs are local goods and services. For 
the sake of simplicity and clarity both growing output volume and improving quality 
count as increased output. 
When we discuss the policy approach to efficiency the usual dilemma is whether 
we should be concerned mostly with inputs or outputs. 
The usual target in less turbulent times is to improve the quality of the services even 
if this is related to increasing costs or making additional investments. In times of crisis 
as budgetary constraints become tighter, inputs will likely become the major priority. 
So the main concern of those responsible for the funding, organization, and delivery 
of services at the local level will now become how to keep costs from rising or how to 
reduce them without too much compromise. Any increase of inputs whether in the 
form of additional costs or new investment is quite unlikely. 
During a crisis there are three options:
 Option 1. 
 Minimize the compromise on outputs resulting from forced expenditure cuts and 
thus reduce the social cost of the crisis. This is the most typical situation when deci-
sions have to be taken under pressure, when budgetary constraints have started to 
work already. The main question is how to reduce costs without making too much 
of a compromise with quality. This can be achieved through wrapping up less es-
sential services or cutting the costs, which will marginally have a lesser effect on the 
volume and quality of the services provided. 
 Option 2. 
 Keep the quality and reduce costs. The reduction of some costs may not affect the 
volume and quality of the services at all. Such costs are unnecessary but in affluent 
times there is sometimes little incentive to look for them. Identifying which costs 
can be reduced harmlessly is a matter of performance measurement. The identifica-
tion of such costs usually requires comparative studies across local authorities using 
benchmarking or unit cost analysis.
 Option 3. 
 Reduce costs and improve quality. There are some cases when it is possible to improve 
quality and reduce inputs at the same time. This is usually related to technological 
improvement and requires a substantial investment, which takes some time to pay 
back. This is hardly the first thing that anyone would risk doing during a crisis. 
But still if a countercyclical intervention can be combined with efficiency gains 
in the long run, it might work well during a crisis. In some cases, however, the 
mere improvement of the management of services, identifying and propping cost 
“leakages” through performance evaluation, can produce a similar effect.
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Annex II
Benchmarking Water Supply 
Management in Hungary
The Benchmarking Club of the Hungarian Waterworks Association was founded in 2007. 
While water and wastewater service providers had for some time already been planning 
to start process benchmarking in Hungary, the impetus came after the International 
Benchmarking Network for Water and Sanitation (IBNET) survey was successfully 
completed and participating companies could start to compare their performance to 
that of their peers.
 The IBNET survey in Hungary was carried out by the Hungarian Environmental 
Economics Center (abbreviated in Hungarian as MAKK). MAKK cooperated with the 
Hungarian Waterworks Association in order to identify water and wastewater utili-
ties which would properly represent the water utility sector in Hungary. The sample 
included mid-sized and large utilities from all seven regions of Hungary, with a mix of 
government-owned regional utilities, local-government-owned utilities, and privately 
operated companies. 
Water utilities in Hungary have long been contributing data to a wide range of sur-
veys, including mandatory data provision to government agencies and authorities, and 
voluntary participation in industry surveys and chamber of commerce data collections. 
The companies, however, rarely received a structured feedback with analysis of the col-
lected data. As part of the IBNET exercise, they were promised a report describing the 
results of the survey, and each participating company would also get a set of diagrams 
showing the performance of the company in specific areas compared to the whole sample. 
Twenty-two companies decided to take part in the survey, while data on two privately 
operated companies, which refused to participate, were collected from public sources, 
including their websites, annual reports, and media articles. The experts of MAKK cre-
ated an English language report to accompany the data sent to the World Bank, and 
produced, in Hungarian, a report as well as the company specific diagrams. The results 
of the IBNET survey were also presented at the annual gathering of the chief financial 
officers of the main water utilities of Hungary.
The feedback from the IBNET survey was appreciated by the participating compa-
nies as well as the officers of the Hungarian Waterworks Association. Besides receiving 
useful results, the IBNET benchmarking exercise also served as an example showing 
how a benchmarking process can be executed in practice.
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The IBNET survey was a good start, but some of the companies wanted to go 
even further. They sought to collect additional data, some of it rather country-specific, 
compute additional indicators, and start an actual exchange of best practices. Thus, in 
early 2007, the Benchmarking Club was founded. 
Participating Companies
While the Benchmarking Club operates under the aegis of the Hungarian Waterworks 
Association, membership in the Club is optional to its members. At the beginning, 
18 companies chose to participate, while additional utilities indicated that they would 
consider membership after the first year of operation. In early 2008, two more utilities 
signed up for membership. 
Member utilities provide about 60% of all drinking water service, and collect a little 
over 25% of all wastewater generated in Hungary. There is substantial diversity among 
members. The smallest utility sells about 1.3 million m3 of water annually, while sales at 
the largest one exceed 150 million m3/year. Some of the companies operate in a major 
town—with or without serving neighbouring smaller communities—while seven of the 
participating utilities serve smaller settlements, with the average number of inhabitants 
below 2,000 per settlement. 
Hungary has flat as well as hilly terrain. Again, there is substantial geographical 
variation among members of the Club. Some of the members serve just one or two 
larger towns in a flat terrain, while others serve dozens or even hundreds of small villages 
in hilly and mountainous areas. The source of water is also diverse for the companies; 
some get their water primarily from bank filtered wells, while others use deep strata 
water or carstic supplies.
The large diversity of conditions under which the companies operate is appealing 
when one would like to understand the operation of the whole water and wastewater 
utility sector of Hungary. Nevertheless, this variety also has a shortcoming; comparison 
of performance indicators among companies needs to be done with caution, carefully 
considering differences in operating conditions.
Rules of Operation
The Benchmarking Club has a management board with five members, who are elected 
for a period of three years and represent member companies. A mixed board of financial 
experts as well as engineers is preferred. The management board meets about six times 
a year, and its main responsibility is to make sure that the Club is operated smoothly 
and in a professionally coherent manner. 
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The following eight thematic working groups have been set up to define the data 
to be collected and the performance indicators to be computed.
 1. Operating conditions
 2. Water service
 3. Wastewater service
 4. Customer relations
 5. Human resources
 6. Investments
 7. Corporate management/Strategy
 8. Finance/Accounting
Each working group has four or five members, who are experts of the member 
companies in the field of interest to the group. The groups also provide whatever theme-
specific assistance is needed within the Benchmarking Club.
The actual benchmarking process is carried out by independent experts. The Hun-
garian Waterworks Association decided to contract the same experts from MAKK who 
originally carried out the IBNET survey. Since these people have since moved to the 
Regional Centre for Energy Policy Research (REKK) at Corvinus University in Budapest, 
REKK was contracted to provide the professional services to the Club. 
REKK, in cooperation with the thematic working groups, develops the data col-
lection methodology, including an Excel-based questionnaire. The questionnaire is to 
be reviewed and updated annually in the spring, based on experience gained during 
the previous year. The questionnaires are filled in by the utilities during May and June 
and then they are returned to REKK, where the received data is screened for errors, 
and then inserted into a database. REKK then computes indicators and also compiles 
summary tables of those data of which indicators are not computed, e.g., information 
on the strategic planning processes applied by the companies. The companies receive 
the first results of the benchmarking exercise early in the autumn, just in time to use 
them for their annual fiscal planning.
An important rule within the Benchmarking Club is that of the confidentiality 
of individual company data. Within the Club only average figures are shared and the 
companies receive only their own individual indicator values, but not that of the others.
The main cost related to the operation of the Benchmarking Club is the consultant 
fee paid to REKK. Utilities pay a Benchmarking Club membership fee to the Hungarian 
Waterworks Association, and the Association will then pay for the services of REKK. 
Additionally, the Association provides the meeting rooms and other infrastructure needed 
for Club meetings, and assists in administrative matters, such as correspondence and 
keeping minutes.
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Annual Results
At the end of the annual benchmarking survey, member companies of the Club receive 
a company-specific document with over 200 charts and tables, illustrating the relative 
position of the company in comparison with the rest of the companies.
During the first year of the Benchmarking Club, 150 indicators were computed for 
two years of data. These indicators were designed by the working groups and the experts 
of REKK together, partly based on international experience (e.g., IBNET website, IWA 
publications). For financial indicators until now only nominal values were computed, 
but in the future inflation-adjusted real values will also be calculated. Indicators on the 
operation of wastewater treatment plants were computed separately for small, medium, 
and large plants, because of the differences in technologies and economies of scale. 
While the surveyed data was thoroughly defined in order to ensure consistency across 
the sample, the results showed that some of the data needs to be further defined, for 
instance, costs relating to maintenance vs. repairs, outstanding revenues, and the number 
of drinking water samples satisfying specific standards.
For each of the indicators, a chart depicted the distribution of the values of the whole 
sample as well as the company’s own value, as illustrated in Figure 42. The document 
also included a table with the average and standard deviation figures for all indicators, 
as well as the company’s own indicator values. This feedback provides utility manag-
ers a chance to observe the performance of their company in comparison with others, 
without seeing the individual indicator values of all the other companies, keeping with 
the data confidentiality rules of the Club.
Figure 42. 
The Position of the Company Compared to the Distribution 
of the Indicator Values of the Sample
+
+
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By mid-2008, three years of data was available (2005–2007) for many of the indica-
tors, making it possible to generate time series in addition to annual indicator values. 
Companies often prefer to compare themselves to a subset of the whole sample—
utilities operating under similar conditions. Therefore, utilities are assigned to groups 
based upon specific criteria, and the indicator values for each of these groups and for 
all indicators are also computed. The table below includes the average values of selected 
groups for one of the indicators, the unit operating cost of water service.
Table 16. 
Unit Operating Cost of Water Service in Selected Group
Group Indicator value (HUF/m3)
Average number of inhabitants per town
—below 3000 (small towns)
224
Average number of inhabitants per town
—above 3000 (larger towns)
170
Standard deviation of the altitude above sea level of the service area—
above 30 meters (relatively hilly area)
237
Standard deviation of the altitude above sea level of the service area—be-
low 30 meters (relatively flat area)
162
Volume of water sold per km of water network 
(m3/km/year)—below 6500 (sparsely populated area)
220
Volume of water sold per km of water network 
(m3/km/year)—above 6500 (densely populated area)
167
Population served with drinking water
—less than 85,000 (smaller company)
207
Population served with drinking water
—more than 85,000 (larger company)
179
Volume of delivered water
—less than 10 million m3/year (smaller company)
203
Volume of delivered water
—more than 10 million m3/year (large company)
180
Note: In March 2008 the USD–HUF exchange rate was at around 167.
Another type of output that companies receive is the distribution of the values of 
a given piece of data. For instance, a company may compare the age composition of 
its wastewater network to the average age composition of the sample companies, as 
illustrated by below.
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Table 17. 
Example for a Distribution Table
Age distribution of the wastewater 
network as of 31 December 2006
Average of the sample Company
0–10 years 46.6% 22.2%
11–20 years 26.7% 31.0%
21–30 years 10.8% 2.8%
31–40 years 8.6% 7.1%
41–50 years 5.0% 33.5%
51–100 years 2.2% 3.4%
>100 years 0.1% 0.0%
Total 100.0% 100.0%
Lastly, information was collected about the practice of corporate management and 
the processes and tools used for strategic planning. This information, by its nature, is 
not numerical, and instead of computing indicators, summary tables were assembled 
showing, for instance, the number of companies using certain standards, or a list of the 
strategic objectives set forth by the management.
In addition to the company specific documents, an annual report is also compiled 
and shared among members of the Club. While this report does not include individual 
utility data, it contains all the average and standard deviation values, summary tables 
compiled from the responses of the companies, the methodologies used during the 
benchmarking exercise, and conclusions reached through analysis of the data. This 
document is available to all the members of the Club, but not to external utilities and 
organizations.
Results are used by the companies in a number of ways. The most typical is identi-
fication of areas where performance can be improved, i.e., where other companies with 
similar operating conditions operate more efficiently or at a lower cost. Benchmarking 
also provides feedback on the success of strategic initiatives—whether they ensured top 
performance among companies. Once time series of indicators are available, management 
can gauge the impact of changes in the company’s operations, such as organizational 
or process reforms, new technologies, or acquisitions. One of the utilities mentioned 
that they used the results from the first year of the Benchmarking Club to justify the 
proposed tariffs when they had to be approved by the municipal owners of the utility. 
Another utility used the results to discuss the potential for cost reduction, again, with 
municipal decision-makers.
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Sharing Best Practices
Getting information on the relative performance of a company is useful in itself, but 
knowing which companies are best in a field, and the reasons for their good performance 
is even more attractive. Since company specific data is handled confidentially, a mecha-
nism was devised to unveil companies with good performance. For each indicator the 
three companies with the best indicator values were identified, and were asked if they 
were willing to disclose their identity. Since companies are not “ashamed” by their good 
performance, they usually agreed to reveal their names and indicator values.
After the list of good performance is compiled, it is shared with all member com-
panies so that they can select those companies, the experience of which they would like 
to hear about, with regard to specific fields of operation. After the feedback from all 
companies has been compiled, it is the task of the management board of the Bench-
marking Club to organize meetings where best practices are shared via presentations 
and discussions. The first such meeting took place in March 2008, and three topics 
were presented and discussed:
 • Ratio of electricity costs among the operating costs of water production.
 • Leaks and other technical problems of the water network.
 • Cost savings and enhanced biological pollution reduction through improved 
wastewater treatment techniques.
Sharing of best practices may also take place on company grounds, especially when 
newly introduced technologies are displayed to the members of the Benchmarking Club.
Future Plans
The Benchmarking Club of the Hungarian Waterworks Association took a promising start 
in 2007. By the end of its first year, the Club had a thoroughly designed set of operating 
rules, a dedicated management board, thematic working groups which created and then 
refined the benchmarking survey and the indicators to be computed. The participating 
companies, for the first time ever, received a large set of data and charts illustrating their 
positions compared to all other water and wastewater utilities within the Club. 
In February 2008, member companies adopted the 2008 work plan, which called 
for revision and more precise definition of some of the data to be collected, international 
cooperation, more active exchange of good practices, and initiatives to recruit additional 
member companies. Some of these items are detailed below.
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In many ways 2007 can be viewed as an experimental or pilot year of the Benchmark-
ing Club. The data survey was ambitious, and in the beginning it was unclear if certain 
pieces of data can be collected with ease or not. By now there is a good understanding 
of the data generating capabilities of the member companies, and subsequently, the 
survey can be adjusted and specific pieces of data will also be redefined.
Some of the companies expressed their desire to gain an international perspective of 
their performance. Therefore, in 2008 the indicator values of foreign utilities, especially 
other Central European utilities, were computed and used as part of the benchmarking 
exercise. The necessary data was gathered from international benchmarking surveys, 
such as the IBNET. There are also discussions of cooperating with other water utility 
associations in the region, with the vision of setting up an international benchmarking 
program.
One of the strategic goals of the Club, for 2008 and beyond, was to recruit additional 
members. This goal was partly driven by the desire to improve the statistical significance 
of results, and to allow advanced statistical analysis of the data set, which requires a larger 
sample size. A larger membership would contribute to wider application of prevailing 
good practices among Hungarian water and wastewater utilities.
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